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INTRODUCTION
The principle of double effect proposes that it is sometimes ethically permis-
sible to unintentionally cause foreseeable harms that would not be permissible
under the same circumstances to intentionally cause. Applicability of double
effect in legal analysis, however, has generally been repudiated on the supposi-
tion that in the eyes of the law an actor is held to intend all the foreseeable,
natural consequences of conduct. As one commentator states the objection:
[T]he law . . . has traditionally postulated the presumption that every person
of sound mind intends the natural and probable (i.e., foreseeable) conse-
quences of her actions. From that perspective, there is no principled moral
distinction between the consequences of one’s actions that are intended and
those that are merely foreseen.1
As so stated, however, such a critique against a role for double effect analysis
in the law succeeds only by undermining basic distinctions made in the law
itself. This point is illustrated perhaps most obviously by noting that liability in
negligence is premised precisely on the view that a categorical distinction exists
between causing a consequence unintentionally when foreseeable as a natural
and probable effect of one’s conduct, and intentionally causing that same
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1. Ben A. Rich, Double Effect and Medical Ethics, UC DAVIS MEDICINE, Spring 2004, http://
www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/ucdavismedicine/past_issues/spring2004/alumni/ethics.html. A similar point
is reflected in the following comments: “[M]ost problematic from a legal perspective, . . . DDE [the
doctrine of double effect] accepts the proposition that the bad effect may be foreseeable but nonetheless
unintended. The law, to the contrary, presumes that a person intends the natural and probable
consequences of his or her actions.” BEN A. RICH, STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: HOW MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE
HAS INFLUENCED MEDICAL ETHICS AND MEDICAL PRACTICE 143 (2001); see also GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE
SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 286 (1958) (“What is true of morals is true of law. There is no
legal difference between desiring or intending a consequence as following from your conduct, and
persisting in your conduct with a knowledge that the consequence will inevitably follow from it, though
not desiring that consequence. When a result is foreseen as certain, it is the same as if it were desired or
intended.”); JERRY MENIKOFF, LAW AND BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION 343 (2001) (“[Double effect] has
had little direct effect on legal analysis . . . . It is a highly technical doctrine, and it is far from clear how
useful it is in distinguishing between permissible and impermissible actions.”).
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consequence.2 If, as objectors allege, double effect fails simply because “no
principled . . . distinction” can be drawn between causing foreseeable harm and
intentionally causing harm, then the very distinction between negligent and
intentional wrongdoing is also done away with.
The need to appeal to a self-contradictory critique to undercut double effect
suggests instead that double effect analysis is rooted in basic insights about
states of mind and culpability already operative in the law. Viewed in this light,
the legal distinction between intentional wrongdoing and negligent wrongdoing
corroborates double effect’s assertion that a fundamental ethical distinction
exists between specifically intending a harmful consequence versus merely
foreseeing that consequence as a more or less natural and probable effect of
one’s conduct.
Even conceding, however, the general similarity between legal analysis and
double effect in the way each differentiates culpability for intentional harm
versus culpability for merely foreseeable harm, disagreement concerning the
liability criteria applied in each analysis poses additional challenges for correlat-
ing double effect and negligence.
Economic efficiency interpretations of negligence, for example, purportedly
based on the Learned Hand Formula and the Restatement (Second) of the Law of
Torts, assert that a finding of culpability in negligence depends upon a utilitarian
balancing of the good effects of conduct (“utility”) compared to its harmful
foreseeable consequences (“magnitude of risk of injury”).3 Under that interpreta-
tion of negligence, however, consideration of an actor’s state of mind—essential
in double effect analysis—ultimately fades into the background and becomes
irrelevant as an essential component in properly assessing liability.
This article elaborates and defends the view that far from being an incompre-
hensible or inapt import from moral philosophy, double effect analysis lies at
the heart of negligence theory. Part I elucidates in more detail the principle of
double effect and describes its prima facie operation in negligence analysis. Part
II considers and rejects the economic efficiency interpretation of basic negli-
2. “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is
risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension. . . . [W]rong is defined in terms of the
natural or probable, at least when unintentional.” Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co. 248 N.Y. 339, 344-45
(1928). See also Beasley v. A Better Gas Co., 604 S.E.2d 202, 205 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (“Liability in
negligence is generally limited to circumstances when an actor could have foreseen that the harmful
consequence would follow naturally and probably from conduct: [T]he injury must be the natural and
probable consequence of the negligence, such a consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of
the case might and ought to have been foreseen by the wrong-doer as likely to flow from his act.”);
Williams v. Indiana Dept. of Corr., 702 N.E.2d 1117, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“In determining
whether a party should be held liable for its negligent act or omission, this court ‘considers whether the
plaintiff’s injury was a natural and probable consequence of the [negligence], which, in the light of
attending circumstances, could have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated.’”); Overseas Tankship
(U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (Wagon Mound No. 1), [1961] A.C. 388, 425 (“It is not the act
but the consequences on which tortious liability is founded. . . . [L]iability (culpability) depends on the
reasonable foreseeability of the consequent damage.”).
3. See infra Part II.A.1.
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gence theory, addressing the challenge that such an interpretation presents for
the effort to situate double effect analysis in the law. Part III illustrates and
confirms the overlap between negligence and double effect analyses by consider-
ation of a sampling of case applications.
I. INTENDING GOOD AND FORESEEING HARM
A. The Principle of Double Effect4
Arising historically from the development of Thomas Aquinas’s discussion of
the ethical permissibility of self-defense and related issues, modern formula-
tions of the principle of double effect (DE) assert that under certain circum-
stances it is licit to perform an otherwise ethically unobjectionable act for the
sake of some good effect, even if that act foreseeably involves causing a
harmful or “evil” consequence.5 The limiting circumstances of DE are com-
monly captured by the following elements:
1. The conduct causing the intended good must otherwise be unobjection-
able (that is, prior to assessment under DE).
2. The intended good effect cannot itself be caused by the unintended evil
effect.
3. The importance of the intended good effect must reasonably justify the
causing of the unintended evil effect, and
4. The evil effect must not in fact be intended as a means or an end by the
agent.6
As these conditions provide, causing a foreseeable harm is permissible under
DE only when the evil effect is unintended and when it does not function as a
causal means to accomplish the good effect. Further, the intended good must be
of such reasonable importance as to justify causing the unintended, foreseeable
harm.
DE has been applied in numerous distinct factual scenarios.7 One contempo-
rary application of DE, in the context of the treatment of terminally ill patients,
4. For more elaborate discussion of the principle of double effect and the nature of intentional
action, see Edward C. Lyons, In Incognito: The Principle of Double Effect and American Constitutional
Law, 57 FLA. L. REV. 469, 492-99 (2005).
5. Id. at 482-84.
6. See Joseph T. Mangan, An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect, 10 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 41, 42-43 (1949) (citing numerous formulations of DE).
7. Common philosophical discussion of double effect includes consideration of a variety of sce-
narios, including among others, terrorist bombings versus strategic bombings, abortion versus therapeu-
tic hysterectomy with death of fetus in utero, pre-emptive killing versus self-defense, and multiple
examples involving trolley cars and the intentional directing of a car to avoid killing certain persons
while foreseeing the death of others as a result. See, e.g., Alison McIntyre, Doing Away with Double
Effect, 111 ETHICS 219-20 (2001).
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is illustrated by the medically accepted distinction between palliative care and
physician-assisted suicide.
The intent of palliative treatment is to relieve pain and suffering, not to end
the patient’s life, but the patient’s death is a possible side-effect of the
treatment. It is ethically acceptable for a physician to gradually increase the
appropriate medication for a patient, realizing that the medication may de-
press respiration and cause death.8
In Vacco v. Quill,9 the United States Supreme Court, expressly relying on DE,
defended the validity of distinct legal treatment of palliative treatment and
physician-assisted suicide based primarily on the differing state of mind of the
agents in the two cases. Rejecting an equal protection claim asserted by
plaintiffs seeking a right to physician-assisted suicide, the Court held that:
[D]iffering treatment of the acts comports with fundamental legal principles
of causation and intent. . . . The law has long used actors’ intent or purpose to
distinguish between two acts that may have the same result. . . . Put differ-
ently, the law distinguishes actions taken “because of”’ a given end from
actions taken “in spite of” their unintended but foreseen consequences.10
The Court explained that in cases of physician-assisted suicide, a physician
and willing patient engage in conduct specifically “because of” the intent to
bring about death: “[a] doctor who assists a suicide . . . ‘must, necessarily and
indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be made dead.’”11 In palliative
care, though the conduct hastens or foreseeably risks hastening the patient’s
death, no similar intent is entailed: “[j]ust as a State may . . . permit[] patients to
refuse unwanted lifesaving treatment, it may permit palliative care . . . which
may have the foreseen but unintended ‘double effect’ of hastening the patient’s
death.”12
More particularly, DE is satisfied in the latter case because the death of the
patient is neither intended as a goal or end of the conduct nor as a means to pain
relief.13 In light of the patient’s dire, terminally ill condition, any incremental
8. Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association, 10
ISSUES L. & MED. 91, 92 (1994). Respiratory depression and death of terminally ill patients from such
treatment, if administered properly, is, in any event, rare. See, e.g., Susan Anderson Fohr, The Double
Effect of Pain Medication: Separating Myth from Reality, 1 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 315, 319 (1998).
9. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
10. Id. at 801-03.
11. Id. at 802 (citation omitted).
12. Id. at 807 n.11 (emphasis added).
13. In palliative analgesic treatment, the intention of the actors is to relieve pain by means of the
psycho-physiological effect of opioids in preventing the experience of pain. See Lyons, supra note 4, at
555-56. This is true even though death may thereby sometimes be foreseeably caused due to the
respiratory depression that can occur as a concomitant, but rare independent effect of opioid administra-
tion. Id. In physician assisted-suicide, however, opioids are not the drug of choice. In such cases of
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unintended shortening of life is ethically justified in view of the significant
relief from suffering offered by the analgesic. In contrast, in physician-assisted
suicide, the intent of the physician and patient is to effect pain relief precisely
by killing the patient. Instead of intending ethically neutral conduct of analgesic
treatment, actors in physician-assisted suicide specifically prescribe a lethal
dose of drugs intentionally aiming at bringing about complete respiratory
depression and death as the means of pain relief.
DE analysis hinges on the belief that important ethical implications often
flow from the distinction between effects an actor affirmatively and intention-
ally desires and chooses to create through his conduct and side-effects the actor
causes unintentionally, albeit foreseeably. This is so because personal responsibil-
ity for action in its paradigmatic form is constituted only under the former
conditions—that is, when particular actions or effects are brought about pre-
cisely because the actor affirmatively wants such consequences to be made real
and thus in a specific manner chooses them to be.14 Under such circumstances,
the causal relation between the actor’s mental inclinations and the realities that
result from those inclinations yields personal responsibility for the actor. By
such deeds, the actor in the strongest manner possible reflexively determines the
sort of person he or she is—that is, in view of the character of the objects and
actions he or she intentionally brings about (either as means or ends) by choice,
actors form and express their own ethical character as persons.15
Merely foreseeable effects, however, are not similarly related to the cognitive-
affective inclinations of the actor and thus do not imply the same level or
intensity of personal identification and, consequently, responsibility.16 The no-
tion of mere “foreseeability” properly captures the limited role played by
foreseeable objects in reasoning about what to do, that is, in practical reasoning.
With respect to such foreseeable objects, the actor has no positive or affirmative
psychological orientation such that he or she can be said to be trying to bring
such an effect about. Culpability for causing merely foreseeable harms therefore
is mitigated by the fact that the actor does not affirmatively desire or choose to
bring about those effects. The actor’s state of mind establishes that he or she
was not the type of person who wanted in a positive, affirmative sense to bring
about that result.
Just because such effects may be merely foreseeable rather than intended,
intentional killing, a barbiturate, not primarily efficacious as an analgesic, is the preferred drug because
of its general, though not exceptionless, reliability in causing death quickly and efficiently. See, e.g.,
Dick. L. Willems et al., Drugs used in Physician-Assisted Death, 15 DRUGS AND AGING No. 5, 335-40
(1999) (a combination of barbiturate and curare are effective for euthanasia, while opioids are less
reliable because of the unpredictable duration of the process of death); Robert D. Truog et al.,
Recommendations for end-of-life care in the intensive care unit: The Ethics Committee of the Society of
Critical Care Medicine, 29 CRIT. CARE MED. 2332-48 (2001) (barbiturates lack significant analgesic
properties and are generally associated with the practice of euthanasia).
14. Lyons, supra note 4, at 493-99.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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however, does not excuse the actor tout court from liability. Culpability determi-
nations regarding conduct under such circumstances then depends upon a
balancing of the interests and rights of the actor to pursue the intended end of
conduct in light of the magnitude and type of foreseeable harm that might be
caused.17
In sum, as opposed to paradigm cases of wrongdoing where an actor intention-
ally seeks to bring about some harm as an end or as a means and is therefore
culpable without further analysis,18 in cases where harm is merely foreseeable
but unintended, determination of culpability requires consideration of whether
the actor’s conduct under the circumstances was reasonable. In such circum-
stances it is precisely DE’s reasonability condition that comes into play: “[t]he
importance of the intended good effect must reasonably justify the causing of
the unintended evil effect.”19
Under DE analysis, if the intended good is not sufficiently important or
consistent with the legitimate interests and rights of the actor (or if the foreseen
harm is of sufficient magnitude and/or is inconsistent with the rights of others
not to have such harms imposed on them), causing that foreseeable harm will be
considered unreasonable and therefore impermissible.
B. Negligence Analysis and Double Effect
1. The Distinction between Intentional Wrongdoing and Negligent Wrongdoing
In exemplar cases of intentional wrongdoing under the law, actors are
culpable because they bring about unlawful effects that they cognitionally and
volitionally specify as ‘what-is-to-be-caused’;20 in negligent conduct, however,
the unlawful effects for which actors are responsible do not correspond to
anything actors cognitively specify as ‘what-is-to-be-caused’ or intended by
their chosen conduct.21 Instead, culpability in negligence arises precisely when
17. Id. at 498-99.
18. Note that in criminal law intent and motive are distinguished. A good ulterior motive generally
will not excuse a particular act of intentional criminal conduct chosen as a means to that ulterior end.
See, e.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.3(a), at 358-59 (2nd ed. 2003).
19. See Mangan, supra note 6 and accompanying text, at 42-43.
20. “There is a continuum from innocent inattention to culpable negligence to wanton recklessness;
but the difference between the latter and actual intent to kill is not simply a further difference in
degree—it is a difference in kind. In plain words, it is the difference between doing an act without
caring what its consequences may be, and consciously intending that the act kill a specific human
being.” In re Jackson, 835 P.2d 371, 411 (Cal. 1992).
Admittedly, this characterization of intentional action fails to resolve important questions of how the
law treats that special subset of effects foreseen with “substantial certainty”; whether it is appropriate to
include them within the category of intentional action; and, if so, how this impacts the validity of the
distinction DE envisions between intention and foreseen consequences. See infra notes 191-193 and
accompanying text.
For a critique of the view that culpability in negligence and intentional misconduct can be calibrated
on a single continuum based on increasing foreseeability of harm, see Lyons, supra note 4, at 510-16.
21. “The term ‘negligence’ is ordinarily used to express the foundation of civil liability for an injury
to person or property that is not the result of premeditation and formed intention. Intent and negligence
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an actor engages in conduct22 and the harmful consequence is not intended but
merely foreseeably risked and when that risked harm under the circumstances is
considered unreasonable.23
These definitions—constituting the most basic forms of culpable mental state,
or mens rea—reflect the law’s categorical distinction between intentional and
negligent conduct—concepts that cut across both criminal and civil law. Dis-
tinct classes of legal conduct, each with its own set of liability norms and
corresponding punishments, are constituted precisely by the differing manner in
which unlawful effects causally originate from an actor’s mental state.24
2. The Role of Intent and Foreseeability in Negligent Conduct
Consideration of these black-letter distinctions between intentional and negli-
gent wrongdoing immediately suggests distinctions in the law similar to those
found in DE analysis. This similarity is first reflected in the fundamental
condition both in negligence and DE that the harm caused by the actor not be
intended but merely foreseeable. The similarity of this characteristic in negli-
gence law and DE illustrates that the law also recognizes a fundamental
distinction between that heightened form of culpability reserved for cases of
intentionally causing harm and cases of causing merely probable and foresee-
able harm.
a. Deliberate Conduct: Intention and Negligently Caused Harm
In this context it is pivotal to note that negligent conduct—conduct by means
are mutually exclusive; one cannot intend to injure someone by negligent conduct, and the absence of a
positive intent to inflict injury is a distinguishing characteristic of negligence.” 57A AM. JUR. 2D
Negligence § 30 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
22. “Conduct” in the sense used here applies both to commission and, in cases where the law
imposes a duty to act, omission. “Since the early law found its hands full in dealing with the more
serious forms of misbehavior, it was natural that the early cases should be concerned almost exclusively
with positive acts, rather than with omissions to act, or with ‘misfeasance’ rather than ‘nonfeasance.’
Slowly, however, the idea developed that certain relations between the parties might impose an
obligation to take affirmative action, so that there might also be liability for nonfeasance.” W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 28, at 161 (5th ed. 1984).
23. See, e.g., Moran v. City of Del City, 77 P.3d 588, 592 (Okla. 2003) (“‘In negligence, the actor
does not desire to bring about the consequences which follow, nor does he know that they are
substantially certain to occur, or believe that they will. There is merely a risk of such consequences,
sufficiently great to lead a reasonable person in his position to anticipate them, and to guard against
them.’”) (quoting KEETON, supra note 22, § 31, at 169) (emphasis omitted); Wisconsin Jury Instruction—
Civil § 1005 (2004) (“A person . . . is negligent, if the person, without intending to do harm, does
something (or fails to do something) that a reasonable person would recognize as creating an
unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person or property.”).
24. “[F]or more than a century, [negligence] has received more or less general recognition as an
independent basis of liability, with distinct features of its own, differing on the one hand from the
intentional torts, and on the other from those in which strict liability is imposed.” KEETON, supra note
22, § 28, at 160-61. “As other courts have recognized, comparison presents practical difficulties in
allocating fault between negligent and intentional acts, because [they] . . . are different in degree, in
kind, and in society’s view of the relative culpability of each act.” Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815,
823 (Tenn. 1997).
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of which harmful effects are unintentionally brought about—does not entail that
the actor’s conduct be unintentional. Although often overlooked in legal discus-
sion, the conduct of the actor by which liability in negligence is created is in
itself usually intentional and directed at other, intended effects.25
When, for example, an actor negligently causes injury in an automobile
accident by driving with excessive speed, it is generally true that the driver
intentionally and knowingly operates the vehicle, often with the express aware-
ness that he or she is doing so in excess of the legal speed. Although an injury to
a pedestrian caused by driving at such a speed may be inflicted negligently and
not intentionally, the possibility of imposing liability in negligence arises
precisely because of the duty of the actor to be aware of the foreseeable danger
created in the context of that very intentional conduct itself.
Further, even if it is occasionally true that the actual conduct causing harm is
not intentional, legal liability usually depends upon the existence of some prior
intentional conduct that justifies imposition of fault-based liability. In cases of
driving under the influence of alcohol, for example, it might be true that
sometimes a driver is so inebriated as to be incapable of intentional conduct at
the time of inflicting injury. In such a case, negligent culpability is traced to that
prior intentional, voluntary act of becoming inebriated when doing so created a
foreseeable risk of unreasonable injury under the circumstances and thus the
actor knew or should have known that his conduct was unreasonable.26
25. “An act committed intentionally may give rise to an action in negligence if one or more harmful
consequences of the act are unintended . . . .” 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 30 (2004). This distinction
is clearly recognized in the seminal negligence case of Brown v. Kendall:
The whole case proceeds on the assumption, that the damage sustained by the plaintiff . . .
was inadvertent and unintentional . . . . We use the term “unintentional” rather than involun-
tary, because in some of the cases . . . the act of holding and using a weapon or instrument, the
movement of which is the immediate cause of hurt to another, is a voluntary act, although its
particular effect in hitting and hurting another is not within the purpose or intention of the
party doing the act.
60 Mass. 292, 294 (1850) (emphasis added); see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.
1928) (guard intentionally helping passenger onto train was not negligent because risk of explosion
from package was not apparent); In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (stevedore intentionally hoisting
cargo that brushed planks, causing them to fall and damage the ship, was negligent because the
possibility of causing some damage was reasonable); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steam-
ship Co., [1967] 1 A.C. 617 (“Wagon Mound No. 2”) (tanker company could be liable in negligence for
intentionally throwing oil into harbor when chief engineer for tanker company could have foreseeably
known that the oil was flammable on water); Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 3 Bing. (N.C.)
467 (C.P. 1837) (defendant intentionally constructing and maintaining hayrick could be negligent when
risk of fire was reasonably foreseeable).
26. See, e.g., People v. Haley, 96 P.3d 170, 192 (Cal. 2004) (“When a person renders himself or
herself unconscious through voluntary intoxication and kills in that state, the killing is attributed to his
or her negligence in self-intoxicating to that point, and is treated as involuntary manslaughter.”)
(quoting People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442, 485 (Cal. 1998)); Biscan v. Brown, No. M2001-02766
COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22955933, at *25 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2003) (“[A] person who voluntarily
becomes intoxicated can be found negligent if his or her conduct does not meet the standard of care
required of a sober person; voluntary intoxication does not relieve a person of his or her own
negligence.”).
460 [Vol. 3:453THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
In typical cases, in order to determine liability for negligently causing harm,
negligence is measured precisely against the recognizable, foreseeable, but
unintended risks that a reasonable person has a duty to associate with the
performance of his or her deliberate, that is, intentional, conduct. If negligence
were not rooted in a basic foundation of intentional conduct, either directly or
derivatively, it would be incoherent to assert that the actor “knew or should
have known” that such conduct was unreasonable.27 In short, DE and negli-
gence both address the question of culpability in the context of intentional
action concomitantly involving the unintended causing of harms.
b. Reasonable Foreseeability of Harm
Further overlap between DE and negligence analysis is reflected in the
constitutive role played by foreseeability in each. As noted above, a primary
function of DE is to delineate conditions under which an actor may permissibly
engage in conduct that has the foreseeable effect of causing or risking unin-
tended harm.28 It is of course precisely that foreseeability of harm that raises an
ethical question. If harm were in principle unforeseeable, no ethical issue would
arise concerning whether one may permissibly act or refrain from acting.
The function of foreseeability in negligence reflects similar suppositions. If
harm caused by conduct was not foreseeable, actors could have no way of
evaluating whether or not such conduct was reasonable in light of that harm.
Accordingly, no basis would exist for asserting that the actor engaged in that
conduct unreasonably, that is, with a wrongful state of mind. As one legal
commentator states this condition: “Unforeseeable injuries set an outer bound-
ary for a norm-based conception of responsibility . . . .”29
27. Of course, the perspective of the negligence analysis generally evaluates the reasonability of
conduct from the “objective” perspective of a reasonable person, but it does so precisely in order to
assess legal culpability vis-a`-vis the “subjective” state of mind of the individual actor. See, e.g., George
Fletcher, The Fault of Not Knowing, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 1, 18 (2002) (discussing how the
paradigm sense of fault underlying negligence liability is rooted in the view that in “having the
opportunity to correct one’s belief and failing to exercise that capacity lies the foundation of the fault of
not knowing”).
28. It is clear, for example, that if some conduct would be justified under DE, though it had the
effect of causing unintended harm foreseen with certainty, the conduct would be justified a fortiori if it
was foreseen to merely risk such harm. See, e.g., Thomas A. Cavanaugh, The Intended/Foreseen
Distinction’s Ethical Relevance, 25 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 179, 180 n.5 (1996) (“[Double Effect] is
usually applied to cases in which the harm is foreseen as an inevitable concomitant . . . . Presumably, if
such an act were accounted ethically in the clear by [double effect], so would an act similar in all
respects but for its causing harm without inevitability.”).
29. Arthur Ripstein, Philosophy of Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND JURISPRU-
DENCE 656, 668 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). “Where x is unforeseeable, the prospect of
it cannot serve to guide conduct, because, being unforeseeable, nothing in particular counts as avoiding
it. Because no norms can apply to such injuries, those who suffer them cannot complain of inappropri-
ate treatment by the defendant.” Id. at 667.
At least one scholar rejects the notion of foreseeability as an appropriate “touchstone” for imposing
liability in negligence. “I . . . argue . . . that our understanding of the tort liability system has been
skewed by an earlier, flawed attempt at descriptive theory. . . . We owe to that theory the view that
negligence is conduct that poses an unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm to others.” Patrick J. Kelley,
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On the other hand, DE further proposes that mere foreseeability of unin-
tended harm does not foreclose the permissibility of conduct. Rather, DE
proposes that, under the conditions specified, the causing of foreseeable, unin-
tended harm may be permissible.30 Similarly, in negligence, mere foreseeability
of harm resulting from conduct, standing alone, does not suffice to establish
negligence and a duty to avoid the conduct. Under the law, some foreseeable
risks are so remote that they must be considered irrelevant for imputing
negligence should that harm obtain—such a risk is sometimes referred to as a
“naked possibility.”31 Negligence analysis instead relates principally to injuries
likely enough to be considered “reasonably foreseeable.”32 As Cardozo noted,
“[t]here must be knowledge of a danger, not merely possible, but probable.”33
Thus, in both DE and negligence, mere foreseeability of harm does not, by
itself, entail the existence of a duty to prevent such harm. In both cases, it is
recognized that attendant risks accompany almost every legitimate human
pursuit. Any rule prohibiting all conduct under circumstances involving foresee-
Who Decides, Community Safety at the Heart of Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315, 317 (1990).
Instead, it is claimed that negligence liability is based, like battery, on objective breaches of accepted
conventions and coordinating norms of the community governing conduct. Id. at 324-25.
While a systematic response to this view is beyond the scope of this Article, one initial objection is
that, while such a theory appropriately stresses the need for the introduction of normative content in
negligence analysis, it underplays the constitutive role of foreseeability in establishing those very
norms. Part of the reason why conventions or norms come to be established is precisely because of
foreseeable risk to substantive values regularly posed by certain forms of conduct. As illustrated by the
complexities surrounding the legal doctrine of violation of statute as proof of negligence per se and
defenses to such a cause of action, decisions relating to breaches of norms and conventions in specific
cases inevitably raise questions concerning the foreseeabilities (on the part of the community and the
part of the actor) involved in proscribing the conduct. Finally, as argued in this Article and by others,
what counts as a relevant foreseeable fact need not entail utilitarian, consequentialist reasoning. Hence,
critique of the univocal, all encompassing “omniscient” foreseeability posited by utilitarianism is
inapposite to a discussion of “reasonable” foreseeability posited on a non-consequentialist interpreta-
tion of negligence analysis. See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.A.3 and following.
30. See Mangan, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., Inc., 256 So. 2d 620, 623 (La. 1972) (rejecting the view that
the “naked possibility” that a third party would move a ladder left unattended by the plaintiff into an
unsafe position constituted an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm that the plaintiff had a duty to
avoid).
32. “Foreseeability is an element of fault; the community deems a person to be at fault only when
the injury caused by him is one which could have been anticipated because there was a reasonable
likelihood that it could happen.” Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 469 P.2d 783, 786 (Or. 1970); see
also Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850, 867 (Lord Reid, concurring) (stating that the foreseeable risk
that a cricket ball would be hit out of the field and hit a passerby on an unfrequented road was so small
that, under the circumstances, a reasonable man would have been justified in disregarding it and taking
no steps to eliminate it).
33. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). Of course the notion of
“probability” in context of negligence does not refer simply to an event that is more likely to occur as
not. “[W]hen the inquiry is one of foreseeability . . . that inquiry is not whether the thing is to be
foreseen or anticipated as one which will probably happen, according to the ordinary acceptation of that
term, but whether it is likely to happen, even though the likelihood may not be sufficient to amount to a
comparative probability.” Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams, 185 So. 234, 236 (Miss. 1938); see also infra
note 37.
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able risk of harm would scrupulously and unreasonably limit normal human
activity. As one legal commentator observes, “[t]he problem is that the only
non-negligent act would be sitting quietly in one’s room. A norm of conduct that
says ‘do not do anything that will foreseeably deprive others of persons or
objects upon which they rely’ precludes almost anything anyone might do.”34
Similar statements have been made in the context of DE analysis: “If one is to
act intelligently . . . one must choose . . . some basic value or values rather than
others, and this inevitable concentration of effort will indirectly . . . interfere
with the realization of . . . other values . . . . These unsought but unavoidable
side-effects accompany every human choice, and their consequences are incalcu-
lable.”35
c. Reasonable Foreseeability of Unreasonable Harm
The preceding considerations disclose that in both DE and negligence, reason-
able foreseeability of unintended harm provides a necessary condition for
culpability. Unreasonably remote risks of harm do not justify imposing restric-
tive burdens on actors and thus do not trigger the necessity for negligence or DE
analysis. Thus mere foreseeability standing alone does not provide a sufficient
condition for imposing liability. Rather, in both DE and negligence analysis,
only when a risk is sufficiently foreseeable to demand consideration does a
determination need to be made whether the conduct in question is still reason-
able and therefore permissible in spite of that reasonably foreseeable risk.
In DE, this condition is explicit: the importance of the intended good effect
must reasonably justify the causing of the unintended evil effect.36 A finding of
negligence, similarly, requires that a reasonable actor knew or should have
known that the harm foreseeably risked under the circumstances was unreason-
able: “[The] idea of limiting liability to that which can be anticipated is
formulated into the foreseeability test for negligence, which states that one is
negligent only if he, as an ordinary reasonable person, ought reasonably to
foresee that he will expose another to an unreasonable risk of harm.”37 Under
34. Ripstein, supra note 29, at 684; cf. Eisenberg ex rel. McNeese v. Pier, 497 N.W.2d 124, 129
(Wis. 1993) (“Nearly all human acts . . . carry some recognizable but remote possibility of harm to
another. No person so much as rides a horse without some chance of a runaway, or drives a car without
the risk of a broken steering gear or a heart attack. But these are not unreasonable risks.” (quoting W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 170 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed.
1984))); Bolton, [1951] A.C. at 867 (“In the crowded conditions of modern life even the most careful
person cannot avoid creating some risks and accepting others.”).
35. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 119-20 (1980).
36. See Mangan, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
37. Jefferson Plywood, 469 P.2d at 786 (emphasis added). Of course the concepts of reasonable
foreseeability and unreasonable harm are not static and unrelated to one another. They may vary
inversely with a finding of negligence under a number of permutations. As the foreseeable probability
of a harm increases, the necessary magnitude of harm required to impose a duty may decrease,
similarly, decreasing foreseeability of harm in conjunction with increasing magnitude of harm might
also be found negligent. Together these two concepts define the parameters of the sort of foreseeable
risks that are relevant in negligence analysis. See, e.g., MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1055 (Cardozo, J.)
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such an analysis, negligence requires a consideration of whether acceptance of
some reasonably foreseeable risk of harm itself is reasonable under the circum-
stances. As one legal theorist notes in this context:
The essence of negligence is unreasonableness; due care is simply reasonable
conduct. There is no mathematical rule of percentage of probabilities to be
followed here. A risk is not necessarily unreasonable because the harmful
consequence is more likely than not to follow the conduct, nor reasonable
because the chances are against that. A very large risk may be reasonable in
some circumstances, and a small risk unreasonable in other circumstances.38
3. Synopsis
The law’s general discernment of a constitutive distinction between intention-
ally causing harm and negligently causing harm as a foreseeable but unintended
effect conforms to the basic distinction between intentional and unintentional
wrongdoing operative in DE analysis. Further comparison of DE and negligence
reveals other more specific characteristics shared by the analyses. In both,
foreseeability of harm is a necessary condition for imposing liability. In ethics
and law, reference must be made to the possibility of deliberative consciousness
of potential results of conduct in order to maintain a fault-based theory of
culpability. If harm was not in any way a foreseeable result of conduct, one
could not be blameworthy for causing that harm.
Both theories, however, also provide that mere foreseeability of harm pro-
vides an insufficient basis for creating a duty to refrain from or modify conduct.
Instead, culpability determinations demand that risked harms be found suffi-
ciently unreasonable before any duty can arise to modify behavior and avoid the
possibility of causing harm.
In sum, both DE and negligence recognize that when harm is not purposeful
or intentional, assessment of culpability involves a finding that the foreseeable
harm is unreasonable. Absent such a finding, no culpability is imposed upon the
actor for engaging in the conduct, even if the risked harm should result.
II. RATIONALITY CRITERIA APPLIED IN NEGLIGENCE AND DOUBLE EFFECT
The overlap between negligence and DE considered in the preceding section
suggests more than superficial similarity. One impediment, however, to equating
the analyses arises out of debate concerning precisely what reasonability stan-
dard operates in each theory; specifically, what functions as the rationale for
(“The obligation to inspect must vary with the nature of the thing to be inspected. The more probable
the danger the greater the need of caution.”).
38. Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1915); see also Gulf Refining, 185 So. at
236 (“The test as respects foreseeability is not the balance of probabilities, but the existence, in the
situation in hand, of some real likelihood of some damage and the likelihood is of such appreciable
weight and moment as to induce, or which reasonably should induce, action to avoid it on the part of a
person of a reasonably prudent mind.”).
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resolving which foreseeable harms are reasonable and which are not.39 Obvi-
ously, if negligence and DE determine the “reasonableness” of the risked harm
in significantly different ways, an effort to find substantive convergence be-
tween them will be undermined.
A. Formulations of Negligence
As numerous courts and scholars have observed, jury instructions on the
issue of negligence are careful not to impose anything but the most general
standard for judging the “reasonableness” of conduct.40 These usually provide
quite broadly that, “[n]egligence is lack of ordinary care. It is a failure to use
that degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would have used under the
same circumstances . . . .”41
In contrast to this vague conception, the standard academic articulation of the
negligence standard—familiar to judges, academics, and law-students—is found
in Judge Learned Hand’s formula.42 Hand proposed that a finding of negligence
involves consideration of three variables: 1) the probability of injury created by
one’s conduct; 2) the “gravity” or magnitude of injury should that probability
obtain; and 3) the interest that the actor must sacrifice or the burden the actor
must suffer to eliminate that risk.43 Restated succinctly in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., Hand suggested that “possibly it serves to bring this notion
into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury,
L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied
by P: i.e., whether B  than PL.”44 Thus, according to Hand, negligence exists
if BPL, where B is the “cost” of the actors sacrificed interest or “burden”
necessary to avoid the harm, P is the probability of harm and L is the extent of
harm or loss.45
Hand’s model appears similar if not identical to the negligence standard of
39. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003)
(discussing dominant approaches operative in negligence law); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on
the Patterns of Negligence, 53 LA. L. REV. 1509 (1993) (same); see also Perkins v. Entergy Corp., 756
So. 2d 388, 402 n.26 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (referencing numerous interpretations of the negligence
standard), aff’d, 782 So. 2d 606 (La. 2001).
40. See Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review of
Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 595 (2002).
41. Id. (quoting N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. 2:10 (3d. ed. 2000)).
42. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damages Awards: Failure of a Social
Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 885 (1999) (stating that some academics “use
Learned Hand’s well-known formula for negligence . . .”); JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Dam-
ages?: Intangible Losses and Comparability Review, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 315 (2003) (“Learned
Hand’s well-known formula for . . . negligence brings this home . . . .”).
43. Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (“The degree of care demanded of a person
by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken
with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice
to avoid the risk.”), rev’d on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941).
44. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
45. “[T]he . . . duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of
three variables: (1) The probability [of the injury]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury . . . ; (3) the
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unreasonableness proposed in the influential Restatement (Second) of the Law of
Torts:
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a
risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the
risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of
the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.46
Under this test, an actor’s conduct is unreasonable and negligent if the utility of
conduct does not outweigh the magnitude of the risked injury.47
1. The Measure for Weighing Utility and Risk
Unquestionably, the most problematic aspect of the Hand formula and the
Restatement’s parallel description of negligence lies in properly interpreting the
meaning of the balancing or “weighing” function and the related notions found
in each expression of the negligence standard. This is of particular significance
in attempting to draw a parallel between negligence and DE because certain
legal scholars, preeminently Richard Posner and William Landes, argue that
these concepts refer exclusively to economic measurements and entail applica-
tion of a utilitarian calculus.48
Posner’s cost-efficiency reading of Hand’s formula proposes that if the
economic costs associated with an actor’s efforts to avoid foreseeable injury
exceed the economic costs of the foreseeable injury, then there would be no
negligence. As Posner explains, elaborating the purported identity between his
theory and Hand’s formula:
burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic
terms.” Id.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965). “The Restatement (Second) of Torts, published
some eighteen years later, reflects the Carroll Towing standard, providing a risk-benefit test for
unreasonable conduct and negligence.” Michael D. Green, Negligence  Economic Efficiency: Doubts,
75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1605-06 (1997).
47. The negligence analysis presented in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001), emphasizes the economic interpretation of
negligence even more strongly, but has had, up to this point in time, little support in the case law and
has met with considerable academic opposition. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001);
Steven Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian Negligence Norms and the Reasonable Person Standard, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 863 (2001).
48. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 1 (1987)
(“[T]he common law of torts is best explained as if the judges who created the law . . . were trying to
promote efficient resource allocation.”). In fact, Landes and Posner go on to argue that not only
negligence but also intentional tortious conduct is subject to a similar mathematical analysis. Id. at 153.
“Most proponents of the economic approach to negligence use as a starting point the formulation of the
negligence standard provided by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.” Hegyes
v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 110 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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It is time to take a fresh look at the social function of liability for negligent
acts. The essential clue, I believe, is provided by Judge Learned Hand’s
famous formulation of the negligence standard—one of the few attempts to
give content to the deceptively simple concept of ordinary care. . . . If the cost
of safety measures or of curtailment—whichever cost is lower—exceeds the
benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society
would be better off, in economic terms, to forgo accident prevention. . . . If,
on the other hand, the benefits in accident avoidance exceed the costs of
prevention, society is better off if those costs are incurred and the accident
averted, and so in this case the enterprise is made liable, in the expectation
that self-interest will lead it to adopt the precautions in order to avoid a
greater cost in tort judgments.49
Restated, if the minimal marginal cost involved in avoiding a probable risk of
injury (either the cost of prevention or abandonment of the conduct) would be
greater than the marginal cost of that risked harm, it will be economically
advantageous, and thus non-negligent, to continue the conduct and allow the
risked foreseeable harm to occur rather than make any effort to avoid it.
2. The Incompatibility between a Utilitarian Conception of Negligence and the
Operation of Double Effect
Before considering whether Posner’s view accurately captures the reason-
ability standard applied in negligence, it is important first to draw out the
manner in which such a view would preclude any linking of negligence
analysis and DE.
Economic efficiency theory proposes that the permissibility of an act,
whether it be intentional or negligent, is evaluated based on whether the
monetary utility of the conduct outweighs the negative economic effects.50
The incompatibility of this view with DE analysis arises from two distinct
yet intertwined lines of reasoning. First, if judgments of permissibility are
based solely upon evaluation of the harmful or beneficial effects of conduct,
considerations of state of mind become irrelevant in establishing culpability.
Second, the economic analysis of negligence reduces the wide variety of
human goods, both intrinsic and instrumental, to a single univocal concept
of value, that is, monetary equivalence.
Illustrative of these points is Posner’s (in)famous analysis of Bird v. Hol-
brook.51 In Bird, a defendant tulip-farmer had purposely set and concealed a
spring-gun in order to disable any thief trespassing upon his property. The
49. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972).
50. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 48, at 149-89.
51. Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J.L. & ECON. 201
(1971) (contrasting the risk of deaths caused by automobile accidents to the deaths caused from
intentionally set spring-guns, and asserting that the permissibility of both is essentially a function of
economic analysis without reference to any consideration of the actors’ states of mind). See also 130
Eng. Rep. 911 (1828).
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plaintiff, Bird, was injured by the gun when he trespassed onto defendant’s land
in an effort to help a neighbor recapture an escaped pea-hen.52
Affirming that “intentionality is neither here nor there,”53 Posner makes no
claim that the defendant’s conduct was unlawful because of anything inherently
wrong with an actor purposefully setting out lethal weapons to defend property.
Instead, Posner argues that an economic interpretation properly captures the
“pattern” of the law.54 In his view, the function of the law is simply to balance
the economic costs to society of raising livestock versus tulip farming. While
spring guns may indeed be the most financially efficient means for tulip growers
to protect their fields, significant costs would inevitably be imposed upon
livestock owners in keeping their animals strictly enclosed should such defen-
sive measures be permitted. Applying these economic considerations, Posner
concludes that a liability determination against the defendant was appropriate
because the economic utility of using spring-guns for tulip owners did not
justify the economic costs imposed upon members of the community.55 For
Posner, it is the economic consequences that matter. Whether the consequences
are brought about intentionally or negligently ceases to be meaningful in
assessing culpability.56 Further, on Posner’s account, no categorical or intrinsic
distinction appears to exist between differing kinds of harm; for example, injury
to human life versus economic harm to crops.
DE, however, proposes that how actors bring about effects makes a great deal
of difference in assessing culpability. Choosing to cause evil or harm purpose-
fully, either as a means or an end, involves a choice that differs in ethically
significant ways from choices that cause factually similar consequences merely
as foreseeable but unintended effects. By failing to appreciate this distinction
and give it meaningful application in assessing liability, economic efficiency
theory ignores a crucial fact about human agency and ultimately undermines a
“fault” based notion of culpability. Such a view disregards common sense
appreciation about what makes intentional harming especially egregious com-
pared to negligent harming.57
Further, DE often bases its determination of the reasonability of intended
good versus unintended harm on the distinction between diverse types of goods
52. 130 Eng. Rep. at 911-13 (1828).
53. Posner, supra note 51, at 206.
54. Id. at 211.
55. Id. at 210. For a more detailed analysis and critique of Posner’s treatment of this case see John
Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 229, 233-35 (David G. Owen
ed., 1995).
56. Although Posner’s economic analysis may take into account the statistical probability of a
consequence occurring, this does not correlate directly to an actor’s state of mind as such. Intention and
negligence cannot be exhaustively captured on the basis of the causal probability of their effects.
Sometimes intended results may be entirely less probable than similar effects brought about negligently.
See Lyons, supra note 4, at 495-96 nn.97-99 and accompanying text.
57. For a more developed argument against utilitarianism and its failure to appreciate the distinction
between intention and foreseeability, see Lyons, supra note 4, at 504-06.
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and differing orders of value.58 These differences often provide a normative
background for justifying the intentional pursuit of one good at the cost of an
unintended but foreseeable harm to another kind. For example, while extreme
conditions of hunger or poverty may in rare circumstances justify significant
risk of unintended harm to basic goods of human life, such as health and safety,
in the normal course of affairs, intentional injury to these goods is not com-
monly understood to be permissible or justified, regardless of the economic
consequences. Posner’s analysis ignores such basic insights concerning distinct
orders of instrumental goods and intrinsic human goods (such as life, health,
and dignity) and subsumes all goods under the application of a univocal
economic calculus.
In sum, if the legality of all conduct is judged based on effects, and if all
effects can be calibrated and compared on a single conception of economic
value, then distinctions in actors’ states of mind and differences among types of
good become irrelevant for purposes of evaluating conduct. If this is the case,
DE is rendered meaningless. Accordingly, any comprehensive utilitarian interpre-
tation of the Hand Formula (or the Restatement test) along the lines proposed by
Posner would render untenable any attempt to correlate DE with negligence.
3. Rejection of Negligence Analysis as Utility-Based
Multiple rationales, however, exist for rejecting economic efficiency as an
appropriate meta-theory of negligence, and critiques of Posner’s and similar
attempts to interpret the negligence standard on such a theory abound. While
exhaustive examination of all these critiques is unnecessary and exceeds the
scope of this Article, it can generally be noted that a significant number of
scholars agree that economic interpretation neither accurately describes how the
negligence standard has been applied in the case law nor does it provide an
adequate normative reading of how the negligence standard should be applied.59
The implausibility of an exclusively economic interpretation as an adequate
account for the “pattern” of negligence is most obviously suggested by arguing
along the same lines of reasoning employed above to show economic theory’s
incompatibility with DE. As pointed out, the distinction between intentional
misconduct and negligence is founded precisely upon the disparate manner in
58. For further discussion of this point see infra Part II.B.2.
59. Goldberg, supra note 39, at 553 (“In its ambition and reductionism, interpretive economic
deterrence theory, at least in the influential version posited by . . . Posner, is perhaps rivaled only by the
vulgar Marxist thesis that each facet of the law is an expression of the class struggle.”); Amartya Sen,
Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
317, 336 (1977) (“The purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron.”); see also, e.g.,
Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 283-85 (1996)
(critiquing efficiency cost-benefit utilitarian theories of negligence); Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner,
and the Myth of the “Hand Formula,” 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145, 152 (2003) (questioning the
interpretation of Hand’s formula); Michael D. Green, Negligence  Economic Efficiency: Doubts, 75
TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1643 (1997) (critiquing the history and meaning of the Hand formula).
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which unlawful effects causally originate from an actor’s mental state.60 To a
significant degree, it is these differences in actors’ mental states that justify
differing assessments of culpability and punishment.
Accordingly, under the common notions of mens rea or fault in the law, there
is little question that similar consequences arising from differing states of mind
would often call for differing assessments of culpability and punishment.
However, by determining liability solely on the basis of a utilitarian weighing of
consequential harms and benefits, economic theory eliminates that decisive role
for causal states of mind in appraising culpability. In so doing, it implausibly
abolishes fundamental distinctions between intentional and negligent conduct
that have played a crucial historical and theoretical role in legal thought and
practice.61
Further inadequacy of the economic interpretation is manifest in its claim that
the function of negligence law is to deter uneconomical accidents. In discussing
negligence liability, Posner observes that with the rise of fault-based culpability
in common law tort, “unless the injurer was blameworthy (negligent) and the
victim blameless (not contributorily negligent) . . . . [a]ccident costs were ‘exter-
nalized’ from the enterprises that caused them to workers and other individuals
injured as a byproduct of their activities.”62 Thus, unless the owner is shown to
be at fault or negligent, injuries to workers or third parties must go uncompen-
sated and be born by the injured.
In developing the precise meaning of fault or negligence in such contexts,
Posner explains that the very notion of “fault” should be understood to apply to
uneconomical behavior:
Because we do not like to see resources squandered, a judgment of negligence
has inescapable overtones of moral disapproval, for it implies that there was a
cheaper alternative to the accident. Conversely, there is no moral indignation
in the case in which the cost of prevention would have exceeded the cost of
the accident. Where the measures necessary to avert the accident would have
consumed excessive resources, there is no occasion to condemn the defendant
for not having taken them.63
Elsewhere, Posner elaborates:
[T]he association of negligence with purely compensatory damages has pro-
moted the erroneous impression that liability for negligence is intended solely
as a device for compensation. Its economic function is different; it is to deter
uneconomical accidents. As it happens, the right amount of deterrence is
produced by compelling negligent injurers to make good the victim’s losses.
60. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
62. Posner, supra note 49, at 29.
63. Id. at 33.
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Were they forced to pay more . . . some economical accidents would also be
deterred . . . . But that the damages are paid to the plaintiff is, from an
economic standpoint, a detail. It is payment by the defendant that creates
incentives for more efficient resource use. The transfer of the money to the
plaintiff affects his wealth but does not affect efficiency or value.64
For Posner, then, the purpose of tort law is not to compensate individual
parties for their injuries. Rather, its object is to deter uneconomical conduct—
that is, conduct which, as Posner avers with seeming Victorian frugality, is
blameworthy because “we do not like to see resources squandered.”65 As it
turns out, the right means of deterring uneconomical conduct is to require the
actor to pay damages in an amount equal to the economic inefficiency—
although it is not essential that the payment be made to the injured party.
It is essential to note in this context that a theory based on economic
efficiency denies that the costs of economical injuries should be paid in tort by
the actor causing those harms. Posner is quite clear that no tort liability in
negligence exists for an actor causing economical accidents. Fault just means
uneconomical. Thus, in circumstances of economically efficient conduct, the
costs of injury must be externalized to the sufferers.
Accordingly, when Posner asserts that “[w]hen the cost of accidents is less
than the cost of prevention, a rational profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort
judgments to the accident victims rather than incur the larger cost of avoiding
liability,”66 he is not contradicting himself but raising for consideration the
incoherence of any view of negligence that would call for that result. In
Posner’s view, there would in such circumstances, of course, be no negligence
for which to pay tort judgments. Posner’s intent is to clarify that if the law were
to impose damages against the enterprise under such circumstances, it would
incoherently create liability without imposing any deterrent upon the enter-
prise’s conduct. As he states, “A rule making the enterprise liable for the
accidents that occur in such cases cannot be justified on the ground that it will
induce the enterprise to increase the safety of its operations.”67 For Posner the
64. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.9, at 78 (1972) (emphasis added, first and
second).
65. Posner, supra note 49, at 33.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 32-33. Posner here appears to neglect the likelihood of punitive damages in such a case.
Precisely in those situations where a defendant knowingly continues to injure based on an economic
efficiency rationale, juries may find the actor’s conduct especially reprehensible and impose damages in
excess of the actual monetary harm suffered by the plaintiff. See also infra note 71 and accompanying
text.
Under some forms of strict liability, as opposed to negligence, such costs might be internalized.
However, as strict products liability analysis moves more and more in the direction of incorporating
aspects of negligence analysis for determining liability, it is difficult to see how under Posner’s view of
tort liability any rationale justifies such internalization. See generally Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking
the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND.
L. REV. 593 (1980).
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correct interpretation of negligence demands that if injury is caused in an
economical accident, no need exists to compensate the injured parties; such
accidents are not wasteful and hence are not negligent.
The flaw with Posner’s account, however, is simply that it does not square
with common sense pre-theoretical notions concerning the primary purpose of
negligence law: that a tortfeasor pays money to an injured party because that
party has personally suffered unjustified harm.68 In other words, it is primarily
the harm to the individual that drives tort law, not society’s general interest in
deterring inefficient behavior and promoting wealth maximization (though, of
course, causal overlap may sometimes exist between these effects).69 While
other reasonable and beneficial results may flow to society by achieving this
goal, Posner’s view itself ironically shows confusion between the intended
purposes and the side effects of the law.
The economic argument would entail, for instance, that no recovery
should be given persons injured or killed by accidents if a defendant can
show that the injury was economically efficient overall. In reality, however,
attempts to rebuff wrongful death or personal injury claims by assertions of
economic efficiency have been taken by juries, not as exculpating, but
specifically as a basis for imposing punitive damages.70 This point is
corroborated in the controversial McDonald’s coffee case, where, despite
significant evidence of economic justification for serving coffee at tempera-
tures high enough to cause third-degree burns, a jury awarded compensatory
and punitive damages to the plaintiff.71
Additionally, in other areas of the law involving negligence-like analysis,
judicial and legislative limitations expressly restrict application of utilitarian
cost-benefit analysis and impose non-utilitarian normative standards. Such limi-
tations include, for example, judicial restrictions on the range of economic
benefits and burdens that may be taken into consideration by a jury72 and
68. Patrick Kelley, Infancy, Infirmity and Insanity in the Law of Torts, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 179, 213
(2003) (“The ordinary tort remedy of compensatory damages, its traditional justification, and the
terminology and operation of the tort liability system, then, all suggest that the practical point of tort
liability, from the internal point of view, is to redress private wrongs.”).
69. “A court performs its essential function when it decides the rights of parties before it. Its
decision of private controversies may sometimes greatly affect public issues. Large questions of law are
often resolved by the manner in which private litigation is decided. But this is normally an incident to
the court’s main function to settle controversy. It is a rare exercise of judicial power to use a decision in
private litigation as a purposeful mechanism to achieve direct public objectives greatly beyond the
rights and interests before the court.” Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 222 (N.Y. 1970).
70. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1037-38
(1991); Amelia J. Uelmen, Toward a Trinitarian Theory of Products Liability, 1 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT
603, 607-10 (2004) (analyzing large punitive damage award in cost-efficient product liability actions);
see also Green, supra note 46, at 1640-42 (discussing the Ford Pinto case and economic efficiency
theory).
71. For a detailed analysis of the McDonald’s case see infra notes 141-155 and accompanying text.
72. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 283, 286 (D.N.J. 1986) (rejecting defendant’s
attempt to introduce benefit of production of cigarettes to society by distribution of profits, employment
opportunities, benefits to suppliers, taxes paid, and charities aided by manufacturer).
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federal statutory regulations, such as that imposed upon the FDA under the
Delaney Clause providing that “no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is
found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal.”73
Further, assertions of economic efficiency as the traditional pattern for com-
mon law negligence is belied by the inherent complexity of the mathematical
analysis demanded. Consider the following example provided by Posner, pur-
ported to be applicable in cases where a court employs cost-benefit analysis to
resolve liability in the context of the relatively simple case of whether a driver
who crossed over a center divider line was negligent in doing so:
In other words, a potential injurer may try to adhere to a level of care y*, but
his realized care will be y  y*  , where  is a random error term with a
zero mean. Although E(y), the injurer’s expected care, is y*, occasionally 
will be negative and y will fall below y*. If an injury occurs when y  y*, a
court that ignored the stochastic element of care, as it would be likely to do,
would find the injurer negligent.74
Such subtlety militates against any claim that it captures the historical approach
of the case law—a function traditionally entrusted to lay juries.75
Finally, corroborating each of these specific objections, numerous opponents
of economic efficiency theory argue broadly that it unjustifiably eliminates
other important human values that the law has traditionally protected. While
such critiques willingly concede that economic factors may often be relevant in
a jury’s deliberations, nothing supports the conclusion that economic efficiency
is or ought to be the raison d’etre of negligence.76 In the social circumstances of
73. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2004). The FDA attempted to avoid the absolute bar to allowance of
additives causing cancer imposed by the plain language of the statute by employing a safety standard of
one in a million lifetime risk as acceptable. This attempt meets with varying success in the courts and
has arguably been lessened by Congressional amendment. However, even under application of that
FDA lifetime risk benchmark, it is obvious that a strict utilitarian cost-benefit analysis has been
abandoned. Limiting conduct only to risks at that allowable level may in fact be uneconomical. See,
e.g., Cary Coglianese and Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk
Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1357 n.436 (2004).
74. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 48, at 72-73.
75. In Todd v. Societe BIC, S.A., 9 F.3d 1216 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc), the court of appeals was
presented with the issue of whether a BIC child-resistant lighter was a defective product under a
consumer expectations test and a risk-utility test relating to the damages caused by a child who played
with the lighter. In discussing the risk-utility test, Posner, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
referred to the complexity of the cost-benefit analysis discussed in the majority opinion and concluded
that “the respective costs and benefits of child-resistant cigarette lighters raise difficult questions that a
jury could not responsibly answer . . . . Is a comprehensive national program of protecting children
from the menaces of everyday life to be formulated and administered by—juries?” Id. at 1225-26
(Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Here Posner’s rhetorical question itself suggests
his doubts about a jury’s ability to assess the “menaces of everyday life.” Arguably, that would be
precisely the sort of danger a jury would be expected to consider under a common law conception of its
role as fact finder.
76. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for Impos-
ing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REV. 465, 468-69 (1978) (“Which is more
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modern life, other values are entitled to at least as much, if not more, legal
protection:
We may ask whether market behavior is not itself simply a special case of
human behavior—whether it too, is only one of a number of different forms
of human choice, which in turn depend upon many different forms of human
valuation and motivation. Human values and goals may take wealth maximiza-
tion into account, but they may not be exclusively or even primarily con-
cerned with it. Human action and human decision may rest only in part on the
type of reasoning acceptable to Landes and Posner’s reductive vision. Ironi-
cally, then, the greatest problem with wealth maximization as a theory of
human practical reason may be that it is insufficiently rich.77
In sum, a thoroughgoing economic interpretation of negligence repudiates
fundamental premises and nuances of fault-based legal systems by destroying
the distinct import of differing relations between mental states and conse-
quences of conduct. It is precisely these distinct relations that to a large extent
constitute and differentiate forms of legal culpability. By collapsing these
distinctions, economic theory dispenses with rudimentary notions of culpability.
Further, such a view unjustifiably dismisses other human values protected by
the law (not to mention common sense) and implausibly reduces culpability
determinations to questions of mere pecuniary value. It is difficult to understand
how any theory that undermines such basic presuppositions of the law could
plausibly make the claim to capture its “pattern.”78
4. Hand’s Understanding of the Formula
In further support of the argument against a reductive economic interpretation
of negligence, evidence from Learned Hand’s own writings strongly suggests
that he did not view the “formula” as a mathematical directive.79 Rather, a
strong case can be made that he intended the formula to be taken as a metaphor
important—efficiency or expectation . . . ? If the society had such a limited economy that efficiency
were necessary for the subsistence of its members, then efficiency would be at least a prima facie
candidate to prevail. . . . A denial of expectations, on the other hand, would be equally offensive in both
a hand-to-mouth and an “affluent” society because such a denial results in the negation of the right of
persons to be viewed as ends rather than as mere factors of production involved in achieving an
efficient society . . . . [T]he entire notion of individual rights becomes highly problematic if social
benefit, no matter how slight, can justify a denial of any such right.”).
77. J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1447, 1475-76 (1987) (reviewing LANDES & POSNER, supra note 48).
78. See Posner, supra note 51, at 211.
79. See, e.g., Villanova v. Abrams 972 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 1992) (“An algebraic formulation of
legal rules . . . has value in expressing rules compactly, in clarifying complex relationships, in
identifying parallels between diverse legal doctrines, and in directing attention to relevant variables that
might otherwise be overlooked. It is not, however, a panacea for the travails of judicial decision-
making. In practice, the application of standards that can be expressed in algebraic terms still requires
the exercise of judgment, implying elements of inescapable subjectivity and intuition in the decisional
calculus.”).
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or rubric that succinctly highlights the need in negligence analysis to juxtapose
considerations of competing rights and values and the demand for a prudential
normative resolution to the question of when injuries to certain human goods
are permissible or not.80
Hand, for example, expressly rejects the view that such determinations can be
reached by mathematical calculus. In his earliest statement on the issue in
Conway v. O’Brien, Hand observes:
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of
three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the
seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which
he must sacrifice to avoid the risk. All these are practically not susceptible of
any quantitative estimate, and the second two are generally not so, even
theoretically. For this reason a solution always involves some preference, or
choice between incommensurables, and it is cosigned [sic] to a jury because
their decision is thought most likely to accord with commonly accepted
standards, real or fancied.81
As indicated in this text, Hand believes such decisions can only be made by
“reasonable persons” applying commonly accepted norms defining the rights of
persons, consistent with existing law, and taking into consideration the complex
question of exactly which norms apply to particular circumstances of each case
and how they apply. This notion is expressly captured by Hand’s later recogni-
tion that “the kernel of the matter . . . is this choice between what will be gained
and what will be lost. The difficulty here does not come from ignorance, but
from the absence of any standard, for values are incommensurable.”82 Else-
where, Hand implicitly restates his repudiation of a quantifiable, mathematical
approach, declaring that “the same question . . . often arises in the law of torts
. . . indeed all questions which depend upon what conduct is ‘reasonable.’ In all
these [cases] the court balances the interests against each other, and awards
priority as seems to it just.”83
80. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982)
(“Though mathematical in form, the Hand formula does not yield mathematically precise results in
practice; that would require that B, P, and L all be quantified, which so far as we know has never been
done in an actual lawsuit. Nevertheless, the formula is a valuable aid to clear thinking about the factors
that are relevant to a judgment of negligence and about the relationship among those factors.”).
81. 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940). As one court has observed citing Conway: “Judge Hand did not
assign numbers to the variables or factors or attempt to apply the formula mathematically.” Krummel v.
Bombardier Corp., 206 F.3d 548, 554 n.2 (5th Cir. 2000).
82. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 161 (1963).
83. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1944). Other statements by Hand
reaffirm this basic view of his position that the “formula” was not meant to encapsulate an economic
theory of negligence. See Barbarino v. Stanhope S.S. Co., 151 F.2d 553, 555 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[W]hen
we . . . fix any standard of care two conflicting interests must be always appraised and balanced: that of
the person to be protected, and that of the person whose activity must be curtailed. It is true that the
interest of the person to be protected must also be discounted by the improbability that it will be
invaded . . . nevertheless, in the end no decision can be reached except by choosing between two human
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Learned Hand’s rejection of a utilitarian interpretation of his negligence
formula rebuts Posner’s attempt to reduce all legally relevant value to econom-
ics. By recognizing that many goods are incommensurable and that reasonable
action often calls for choices between intended goods and unintended effects,
Hand’s understanding of his formula presents no obstacle for seeing the opera-
tion of double effect analysis in the law of negligence. Hand’s view of his
formula entails none of the premises that require one to conclude along Posner’s
line of reasoning that “intentionality is neither here nor there.”84
5. The Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Meaning of “Value”
The Restatement (Second) of Torts’ clarification of its “balancing” test simi-
larly indicates that no mere economic model exhausts the values that must be
“weighed” in determining whether conduct is reasonable. Evidence of the
non-reductive character of the Restatement’s negligence standard is captured in
the Restatement’s broad definitions of “utility of the actor’s conduct”85 and the
parallel definition of “magnitude of risk.”86 Both of these Restatement concepts,
and their elaboration in official commentary, rely on the related Restatement
concepts of “interest” and “the value which the law attaches to such an
interest.”87
The connection between these ideas is aptly illustrated in section 291’s
commentary on the “weighing” of utility and risk—precisely the issue under
consideration:
interests, one of which must be sacrificed. Such choices are the very stuff of law . . . .”); McGhee v.
United States, 154 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1946) (“The standard of care in any situation is determined by
balancing the risk against the cost of precaution. In the end that always demands a choice between
values, and the most vital national interests precluded precautions that might have been proper, if less
had been at stake.”); In re Lee Transit Corp., 37 F.2d at 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1930) (“[I]n such matters the
real appeal is to the average opinion as to what conduct is proper.”); see also Wright, supra note 59, at
157-58 (arguing that Hand’s own description illustrates a rejection of a utilitarian approach to
negligence analysis).
84. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292 (1965) (“Factors Considered In Determining Utility of
Actor’s Conduct. In determining what the law regards as the utility of the actor’s conduct for the
purpose of determining whether the actor is negligent, the following factors are important: (a) the social
value which the law attaches to the interest which is to be advanced or protected by the conduct; (b) the
extent of the chance that this interest will be advanced or protected by the particular course of conduct;
(c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be adequately advanced or protected by another and
less dangerous course of conduct.”).
86. Id. § 293 (“Factors Considered In Determining Magnitude Of Risk. In determining the magni-
tude of the risk for the purpose of determining whether the actor is negligent, the following factors are
important: (a) the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are imperiled; (b) the extent
of the chance that the actor’s conduct will cause an invasion of any interest of the other or of one of a
class of which the other is a member; (c) the extent of the harm likely to be caused to the interests
imperiled; (d) the number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the risk takes effect in
harm.”).
87. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Weighing risk against utility of conduct which creates it. The magnitude of the
risk is to be compared with what the law regards as the utility of the act. If
legal and popular opinion differ, it is the legal opinion which prevails. The
point upon which there is likely to be such divergence between the two is
usually in respect to the social value of the respective interests concerned. If
the legal valuation differs from that attached to the respective interests by a
persistent and long-continued course of public conviction, as distinguished
from a novel and possibly ephemeral opinion, courts should and often do
re-examine their valuation and make it conform to the settled popular opin-
ion.88
Contrary to an univocal, unvarying economic interpretation of the notion of
“interest” and “valuation” expected on Posner’s view of negligence, the terms
as employed suggest a much more varied texture. Consider, for example, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts broad definition: “§ 1. Interest: The word ‘inter-
est’ is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the object of
any human desire.”89 Commentary to this section elaborates the relation be-
tween this multivalent concept and how the law comes to attach “value” or
protection to such interests.90 Without any mention of economic considerations,
the Restatement provides simply that the law’s valuation—the determination of
whether legal protection will be extended to interests in the form of rights91 and
the extent of that legal protection92—is a process guided by stable community
consensus and opinion.
Thus, without begging the question about what society values, there is no hint
in the Restatement commentary that economic efficiency alone provides the
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 cmt. d (1965).
89. Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
90. Id. § 1, cmt. a (“As defined in this Section, the word ‘interest’ is used to denote anything which
is the object of human desire. It carries no implication that the interest is or is not given legal
protection, that is, that the realization of the desire is regarded as of sufficient social importance to lead
the law to protect the interest by imposing liability on those who thwart its realization.”); id. § 1, cmt. d
(“Legally protected interests. If society recognizes a desire as so far legitimate as to make one who
interferes with its realization civilly liable, the interest is given legal protection, generally against all the
world, so that everyone is under a duty not to invade the interest by interfering with the realization of
the desire by certain forms of conduct.”).
91. Id. § 1, cmt. b (“‘Interest’ as distinguished from ‘right’. In so far as an ‘interest,’ as defined in
this Section, is protected against any form of invasion, the interest becomes the subject matter of a
‘right’ that either all the world or certain persons or classes of its inhabitants shall refrain from the
conduct against which the interest is protected, or shall do such things as are required for its
protection.”).
92. “Thus the interest in bodily security is protected against not only intentional invasion but against
negligent invasion or invasion by the mischances inseparable from an abnormally dangerous activity.
Every man has a right, as against every other, not to have his interest in bodily security invaded in any
of these manners. On the other hand, the interest in freedom from merely offensive bodily contacts is
protected only against acts done with the intention stated as necessary in that part of the Restatement
which deals with liability for such contacts . . . . Therefore, there is a right to freedom from only such
contacts as are so caused, and there is no duty other than a duty not to cause offensive touchings by acts
done with the intention there described.” Id. § 1, cmt. d.
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basis for legally “valuing” interests or limiting the protection of that interest.
Rather, the text expressly indicates—without any reference to economic analy-
sis—that the object of legal protection may be any human interest, that is, any
human desire shared by the community: “Thus emotional tranquility, for which
the great mass of mankind feels a keen desire, is as much an ‘interest,’ as
‘interest’ is defined in this Section, as is the interest in the possession of land or
the security of one’s person.”93
Just as consideration of Hand’s specific description of his understanding of
the negligence formula undercuts any claim that it is rooted in a reductive
economic utilitarianism, so too a straightforward reading of the relevant Restate-
ment provisions leads to no such conclusion. Instead, the considerations rel-
evant to weighing the intended goods of conduct in contrast to the unintended
but foreseeable harms, is open to the recognition and protection of a wide
variety of goods and human desires that appears to have no utilitarian underpin-
ning, and thus, presents no obstacle to the application of double effect analysis.
6. Jury Instructions and Negligence Theory
Having argued in the preceding sections that neither the Hand formulation
nor the Restatement (Second) of Torts necessarily entails utilitarian economic
analysis, attention should be given to the apparent discrepancy between these
formulations and the very general character of the negligence instruction pre-
sented to jurors.94
In this context, some historical analysis is helpful. It appears likely that the
“weighing” or balancing concept in negligence was first explicitly introduced
by Professor Henry Terry early in the twentieth century.95 Terry described the
determination of negligence as dependent upon a consideration of five separate
factors:
(1) The magnitude of the risk;
(2) The value or importance of that which is exposed to the risk, which
may be called the “principal object”;
(3) A person who takes a risk of injuring the principal object usually does
so because he has some reason of his own for such conduct,—is pursuing
some object of his own. This may be called the collateral object. In some
cases, at least, the value or importance of the collateral object is properly to
be considered in deciding upon the reasonableness of the risk;
(4) The probability that the collateral object will be attained by the conduct
which involves risk to the principal [object]: the utility of the risk; and
(5) The probability that the collateral object would not have been attained
without taking the risk: the necessity of the risk.96
93. Id. § 1, cmt. a.
94. See supra notes 40 and 41 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Green, supra note 46, at 1627-28 (describing the influence of Terry’s article on Francis
Bohlen, reporter for the first Restatement of Torts). Green then shows the influence of the first
Restatement on Learned Hand’s formulation of negligence in Carroll Towing. Id. at 1629.
96. Terry, supra note 38, at 42-43.
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At first glance Terry’s formulation seems technical and overly complex. Once
the anachronistic specter of economic efficiency has been exorcised, however, it
becomes manageable. The text, at least on a sympathetic reading, encapsulates—
admittedly in formal, cumbersome language—all those considerations that a
reasonable person might contemplate when determining the reasonableness of
some proposed conduct.
First, one would consider, to the extent reasonably possible, if the proposed
conduct seeking to achieve some intended good (the collateral object) would
foreseeably cause some harm (the principal object) and, if so, how serious that
harm might be.97 Second, it would be appropriate to consider how likely it is
that one’s intended good would in fact be achieved by the proposed conduct and
how important that good was in comparison to the risked harm.98 Finally, the
actor might consider whether there existed any alternative way of bringing
about that good more safely, that is, without causing (or lessening) the risked
harm.99
As Learned Hand counseled, however, no mathematical quantification and
analysis can resolve all such considerations.100 Varying and incommensurable
interests in the real world, limitations of practical reason, and the inability to
foresee all the consequences of conduct make any such expectations unrealistic.
Resolution instead demands consideration of the competing interests and rights
of the parties and requires the jury to apply its best sense of fairness and justice
as dictated by community standards.
This is supported by Hand’s observation that “a solution always involves
some preference, or choice between incommensurables, and it is cosigned [sic]
to a jury because their decision is thought most likely to accord with commonly
accepted standards, real or fancied.”101 In appraising a party’s negligence (or
lack thereof), a jury uses the test of a “reasonable person” to determine,
according to the “common standards” of fairness and justice, balancing all
interests economic and non-economic, whether the interest(s) pursued by the
actor and the manner in which he or she pursued it, warranted, under all the
circumstances, the risk of foreseen harm to the plaintiff’s interest(s).102
97. Id. From an intentionality point of view, it would make more sense to describe the intended
effect of conduct as the principal object and the unintended, foreseeably risked harm as the collateral
object. Because, however, Terry is focusing precisely on the negligently caused harm, it makes sense
for him to call that negligently inflicted harm the “principal” object and the intended good the
“collateral” object.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See supra Part II.A.4.
101. Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d. Cir. 1940).
102. “The balancing test, per se, may remain, as such phraseology may adequately be used to
characterize a theory-neutral, normatively pluralistic account of the reasonable person standard.”
Hetcher, supra note 47, at 869. “[O]rdinary usage also permits a more general sense of the words
“weigh” and “balance” to mean simply that rational actors may take account of numerous factors in
their practical reasoning with regard to a particular issue. There is nothing intrinsically utilitarian or
consequentialist in practical reasoning.” Id. at 882.
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Interpreted in this light, it becomes clear that the very generality and open-
endedness of the negligence inquiry—as opposed to the narrow utilitarian sense
envisioned by Posner—is perfectly encapsulated in the common jury instruc-
tion: “Negligence is the doing of something which a reasonably prudent person
would not do, or the failure to do something which a reasonably prudent person
would do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.”103 By
means of such an instruction, the court directs a jury to consider everything that
a reasonable person would consider in determining whether defendant’s conduct
was not simply economical, but reasonable. As one legal commentator ex-
presses this common sense connection between the jury’s function and Hand’s
balancing test: “Stripped of rhetoric . . . the so-called Hand factors are simply
the core factors of any account of negligence. These factors will be present
under any theoretical conception of the reasoning processes engaged in by
jurors.”104
7. Synopsis
It is of course possible (and perhaps probable) that proponents of economic
efficiency theory will go beyond Hand and the Restatement’s broad understand-
ing of the notion of value and attempt to impose upon all questions of legal
value a filter of economic analysis. The preceding discussion has illustrated,
however, that neither of these influential articulations of the negligence formula-
tion endorses, much less necessitates, such a reduction.
This, of course, is not to assert that economic analysis is in all circumstances
irrelevant and unrelated to liability determinations. Community conceptions of
what is fair and right often undoubtedly involve economic considerations,
especially when the conflicting interests of the parties involve benefits and
harms that can be easily measured in economic units, for example, injuries to
“interests” in fungible goods or property.105 Thus, the critique of economic
analysis developed here should be understood as rejecting only the universal
103. Cal. B.A.J.I. Civ. 3.10 (2004); see also Ill. P.J.I. Civ. 10.01 (2000) (“When I use the word
‘negligence’ in these instructions, I mean the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person
would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful person would not do, under
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful
person would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.”); N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. 2:10 (3d.
2000) (“Negligence is lack of ordinary care. It is a failure to use that degree of care that a reasonably
prudent person would have used under the same circumstances. Negligence may arise from doing an act
that a reasonably prudent person would not have done under the same circumstances, or, on the other
hand, from failing to do an act that a reasonably prudent person would have done under the same
circumstances.”). See generally Kelley & Wendt, supra note 40, app. at 629-30, 640-41, 658.
104. Hetcher, supra note 47, at 882.
105. Hegyes v. Unjian Enter., Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 110 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting) (“Economic analysis limits it [sic] focus to a single societal value—economic efficiency—
rather than the full scope of values . . . . Nonetheless, it is an important value and one worth weighing
when deciding the overall merits of a given common law legal rule.”).
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reductive claims made by a law and economics theory of negligence.106
Further, even when the conflicting values at issue are not strictly fungible,
protecting some interests over others may result in economically efficient
behavior precisely because the economic valuations at stake themselves result
from society’s pre-economic appraisal of the relative importance of the inter-
ests. In such cases, protecting one human interest over another may incidentally
conform to economic efficiency even though the interests themselves are not
legally valued primarily because of their economic worth.107
As already suggested, however, this lends no support to the conclusion that
negligence will track norms of economic efficiency in all cases, as when, for
example, death, serious bodily injury, or basic personal integrity are at stake.
Economic valuation does not exhaust the community’s esteem for all inter-
ests.108
B. Negligence and Normative Limits
If the preceding section is correct in its conclusion that economic efficiency
does not and should not function as the exclusive criterion for balancing or
weighing goods and harms in negligence, it may be helpful to offer at least one
example of an alternative account of the types of values that may properly
inform a jury’s “weighing” of competing “utility” and “risk.”
In general, consistent with Hand’s observations, the Restatement, its commen-
tary, and the common negligence jury instruction,109 no a priori limitation exists
on the values that may inform that balancing analysis. Determinations of
negligence require consideration of whatever values a reasonable jury (as a
sampling of persons whose views and judgments embody community stan-
dards) believes is appropriate, given the circumstances of a particular case, for
legal protection. Upon consideration of these values, the jury is called upon to
106. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1043 (1985) (“It
is hard to understand the radical break that economic analysis represents. If one follows out the logic of
an economic approach to tort law, then I never have any rights, at least in the way that we have been
accustomed to thinking about them. All I have instead is an entitlement to have some court go through a
cost-benefit calculation to determine whether the activity I am engaged in is economically worthy of
protection.”).
107. One scholar has illustrated this point by suggesting that the criminalization of rape could be
justified by showing that it maximized society’s interest in sleep. “A reasonable person would probably
respond that this explanation is ridiculous—rape is prohibited by our society because it offends our
most deeply held beliefs about personal dignity and autonomy, not because it maximizes the hours we
sleep.” Balkin, supra note 77, at 1474-75. This example specifically responds to Landes’ and Posner’s
peculiar attempt to illustrate the economic efficiency of laws against rape. See LANDES & POSNER, supra
note 48, at 157-58.
108. Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (“Legal ‘compensation’ for personal
injuries does not actually compensate. Not many people would sell an arm for the average or even the
maximum amount that juries award for loss of an arm.”). See also Linda L. House, Note, Section 1983
and the Collateral Source Rule, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 101, 105 (1992) (“[L]egal compensation is not
truly adequate compensation. Particularly in personal injury cases, a plaintiff can never really be made
whole.”).
109. See supra Part II.A.4-6.
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make its best judgment concerning whether the unintended harm was reason-
ably justified in light of the good intended. No mathematical formalistic prin-
ciple can resolve the tension between all such clashes.
Such a view is supported by growing recognition in tort scholarship that
reductionist theories like those of Posner are misguided. Rather than offering a
single heuristic principle for interpreting all tort decisions as affecting maximiza-
tion of a single value or goal, a growing consensus understands negligence, as a
part of tort law generally, to embrace a wide set of component goals, for
example, deterrence, economic efficiency, and social justice.110 In such circum-
stances, it is the job of the court (jury and judge) to “exercise judgment by
achieving an ineffable balance among diverse and sometimes antithetical consid-
erations with respect to any given decision.”111
1. Equal-Negative Rights and Negligence
As indicated by Hand’s observations above, however, “ [i]n all these [cases]
the court balances the interests against each other, and awards priority as seems
to it just.”112 Thus, in a very general sense, while no single concrete qualitative
value exhausts negligence determinations, there is at play in Hand’s mind a
general conception of fairness that guides and informs the incommensurable
value decisions.113 Such a heuristic principle, unlike Posner’s theory, does not
reductively eliminate the uniqueness of the individual values, but can still
provide a framework for choosing between them.
Describing one articulation of such an over-arching, justice-based conception
of negligence analysis, Richard Wright asserts:
Tort law falls within the domain of corrective justice . . . . Corrective justice
aims at securing each individual’s person and existing stock of resources
against conduct by others that would be inconsistent with the equal negative
110. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 39; Galligan, supra note 39; Perkins v. Entergy Corp., 756 So.
2d 388, 402 n.26 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Green, supra note 46, at 1643 (“[T]ort law may be an amalgam
of efficiency, corrective justice, pragmatism, all leavened with whatever the contemporary cultural,
political, and social attitudes happen to be.”).
Such an interpretation also explains, in a way that economic analysis cannot, why certain types of
conduct may not be subject to liability although from an economic point of view such conduct could
often be considered inefficient. Examples such as the general avoidance in negligence of imposing an
affirmative duty to aid or a duty to avoid purely economic harm explicitly confirm that other ethical and
non-utilitarian considerations or conceptions of “duty” must inform and specify the balancing of goods
and harms.
111. See Goldberg, supra note 39, at 580.
112. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1944).
113. Goldberg makes a similar point: “Must we, or ought we concede that all we can say of any
given tort decision, or any given tort doctrine, is that, if well-rendered, it will reflect the attainment of
an unarticulated and unarticulable balance among various considerations—including some that are
diametrically opposed? I suggest that, to make such a concession is to give up on the idea of law. . . . I
would conjecture that most lawyers and citizens . . . expect the law to aspire to coherence—a demand
rooted in elemental notions of fairness, predictability, and efficacy.” Goldberg, supra note 39, at 580.
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freedom of all . . . the freedom from unjustified interference with one’s use of
one’s existing resources to pursue one’s projects or life plan . . . .114
Such a description illustrates how, without restricting any particular factors
that a jury may consider, a general normative limit in negligence exists that
delineates those harms that can foreseeably but unintentionally be imposed
upon others and those that cannot. Positing this limitation in the concept of
“equal negative freedom,” Wright argues that this boundary is defined by the
demand that no individual be treated merely as a means to another’s goals.115
Stated otherwise, an actor’s conduct may not permissibly interfere with other
people’s freedom to pursue their own personal ends if the actor’s conduct
foreseeably entails an attitude or point of view that treats the others’ goods as
purely instrumental means to the actor’s own interests. Any risk that an actor
imposes on others, therefore, must be a risk that an actor believes can be
reasonably imposed on him and other members of society in generally similar
circumstances.
[J]ustice requires that others who interact with you in ways that may affect
your person or property do so in a way that is consistent with your right to
equal negative freedom, and vice versa. It does not prohibit all adverse
impacts, or risks thereof, on others’ persons and property. Such a prohibition
would greatly decrease each person’s external freedom rather than enhancing
it. It rather allows a person to engage in conduct which creates risks to others’
persons and property, but if and only if the allowance of such conduct by
everyone in similar circumstances will increase everyone’s equal freedom,
rather than increasing some persons’ external freedom at the expense of
others’ external freedom.116
Arthur Ripstein makes a similar point referring specifically to the limit of the
“restraint” on conduct imposed under the negligence standard:
[T]he reasonable person is the one who exercises appropriate restraint in light
of the interests of others. The reasonable person is a construct to strike a
balance between different interests. Decisions about such matters invariably
import substantive judgments about what is important to a person’s ability to
lead a self-directing life. Such matters will occasionally be controversial,
though most such interests—freedom of action and association on the one
hand, and bodily security and security of possession on the other—will not.117
114. Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF TORT LAW 249, 256 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
115. Id.
116. Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 143, 166
(2002).
117. Ripstein, supra note 29, at 663.
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In Wright’s and Ripstein’s view, liability is restricted to situations when a
reasonable person would regard conduct as unfairly interfering with another’s
reasonable freedom to pursue his or her own ends. In this context, “unfairly”
does not denote any particular quantitative, mathematical limitation, but refers
to a prudential determination based on notions of personal respect and reasonabil-
ity. Thus interpreted, negligence law introduces a limitation upon permissible,
lawful risk exposure to others based ultimately not on economic efficiency, but
on respect due to their independent status as persons living in community.118
Respect for the interests of others, however, does not entail a duty always to
refrain from conduct creating a risk of foreseeable harm, even serious harm, to
others. Rather, as recognized by both Wright and Ripstein, harm is permissible
as a risked unintended side-effect of conduct whenever pursuit of one’s own
interests respects or is “proportionate” or “fair” in comparison to the rights of
others to reasonably pursue their interests: “[R]eciprocity . . . grows out of an
idea of private persons pursuing their separate ends, and supposes that standards
of conduct are reciprocal just in case they enable each person to pursue his or
her ends as much as is compatible with others pursuing their own ends.”119
In short, the dividing line between permissible and impermissible risk of
unintentional harm lies precisely at that point where the risk in question respects
or fails to respect others’ reciprocal rights as persons seeking their own ends. As
Ripstein restates this concept in respect to negligence analysis, “[i]n the idiom
of responsibility, norms of conduct mark the line between what a person has
done and what is (merely) a by-product of her action.”120
2. Parallel Standards of Reasonability in Negligence and Double Effect
Having offered good reasons for rejecting utilitarian economic efficiency as
an appropriate model for understanding the reasonableness standard in negli-
gence, and having described at least one alternative interpretation suggested by
a rights-based analysis, it is appropriate to return to the link between negligence
and DE and the reasonability criterion at play in each.
In addition to the other basic requirements of DE—that a good be intended,
that the action be permissible in its own right, and that the harm be uninten-
tional—permissibility under DE, as in negligence, requires a determination of
whether the intended good is “sufficiently reasonable” or “proportionate” when
118. Wright, supra note 114, at 259 (“To have sufficiently secure expectations, one’s right in one’s
person and property must be defined by an objective level of permissible risk exposure by others which,
under the moral categorical imperative . . . must be equally applicable to all and objectively enforced.”).
119. Ripstein, supra note 29, at 661. An analogous point is reflected in the following Restatement
commentary distinguishing the duty not to intentionally cause offensive contacts from the duty not to
cause unintentional offensive contacts: “[T]he interest in freedom from . . . offensive bodily contacts is
protected only against acts done with the intention stated as necessary in that part of the Restatement
which deals with liability for such contacts. . . . Therefore, there is a right to freedom from only such
contacts as are so caused, and there is no duty other than a duty not to cause offensive touchings by acts
done with the intention there described.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. d (1965).
120. Ripstein, supra note 29, at 661.
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balanced against the foreseeable unintended evil. Specifically, this element of
DE provides that the importance of the intended good effect must reasonably
justify the causing of the unintended evil effect.121 In parallel to the negligence
analysis, DE insists that the actor consider whether the “utility” of the conduct,
or in Terry’s terms the “value or importance of the . . . object” intentionally
chosen,122 justifies the unintended risk of foreseeable harm created by such
conduct. Under DE, if the unintended harm is not justified in light of that
intended object, such action is not permissible.
As explained above, however, the proportion between the intended good and
the unintended harm cannot coherently refer to a utilitarian commensuration.123
Such a consequentialist analysis ultimately undermines DE’s reliance on the
distinction between intention and mere foreseeability as bearing meaningful
ethical import.124 Further, it eliminates the possibility of distinct orders of value
that create the possibility of rational choice between alternative courses of
action.125 In DE, determinations of permissibility demand a balancing of in-
tended values and rights versus unintended harms to other values and rights.
Akin to Hand’s discussion of incommensurables and the Restatement’s “inter-
est” as the object of any human desire,126 DE is founded on the view that
questions of permissibility cannot be reduced to a mathematical calculus.
Rather, such decisions require choice among alternative values guided by
normative limitations of reasonability and ethical fairness.
In particular, DE hinges on two normative distinctions between types of
goods that appear fundamental in resolving questions of permissibility in the
context of conduct involving risk of unintentional harm to basic human goods
such as life, physical integrity, and basic human dignity—the types of harm
most often at issue in DE considerations.127 First, when intentionally pursuing
otherwise legitimate goods that instrumentally support basic human goods (for
example, instrumental goods such as food, shelter, transportation, clothing), one
should not engage in conduct that in a reasonably foreseeable manner risks
significant harm to intrinsic human goods.128 Significant harm here logically
121. See Mangan, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
122. See Terry, supra note 38, at 43.
123. See supra Part II.A.2.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Germain Grisez, Against Consequentialism, 23 AMER. J. JURIS. 21, 43 (“[G]iven the
commensurability required by the consequentialist’s theory of judgment, no one can do what one ought
not, since no one can deliberately prefer the lesser good. The reason for choosing the greater
good—assuming the goods are commensurable—is not merely a good reason, it is a sufficient
reason.”).
126. See supra Parts II.A.4, 5.
127. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 7 (referencing commonly discussed DE scenarios).
128. For the commonplace distinction between basic or intrinsic goods and instrumental goods see,
for example, DAVID S. ODERBERG, MORAL THEORY 44-45 (2000): “Some goods—the possession of
money, for instance—are purely instrumental. But no basic good is solely instrumental in character;
each good . . . is basic precisely because it itself is a component of the happy life. If any one of them is
turned away from, rejected or compromised in general life goes badly . . . .”
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entails reference to any permanent or serious injury, or curtailment of physical
or psychological well being. It denotes substantial destruction of the very
conditions necessary for an individual’s pursuit and attainment of essentially
personal ends, that is, basic human goods.129
However, this normative limitation upon choice recognizes that pursuit of
instrumental goods often carries with it, as a reality of the contingent state of the
world, the possibility of causing unintentional harm to fundamental human
goods. Under concrete conditions, obtaining instrumental goods necessarily
subjects inherent goods to unavoidable risks. Because instrumental goods are by
their nature directed at human existence in its various basic requirements as an
end, it is reasonable, and therefore ethically required, that pursuit of such goods
be constrained by the purpose for which they are sought. A limitation restricting
intentional pursuit of instrumental goods under normal conditions to conditions
when there is no “reasonably foreseeable risk of significant harm” to human
life, safety, or dignity preserves the inherent relation between these distinct
types of goods.130
A second norm applicable under DE analysis in determining the permissibil-
ity of unintended harm is more complex and functions inversely to the first:
when conduct is intended to protect some fundamental human good (either in
oneself or another), one may unintentionally (but not intentionally) cause
reasonably foreseeable risks of significant harm to either instrumental or intrin-
sic human goods (of an identical or different type).131
In contrast to the incompatibility of such conduct with an economic effi-
ciency model of value, the permissibility of causing unintentional harm to
instrumental goods for the sake of the intentional conservation of intrinsic
goods presents no difficulty for DE.132 Insofar as instrumental goods are human
goods only to the extent that they are rationally subordinated to basic, fundamen-
tal goods as their end, DE proposes that instrumental goods may unproblemati-
129. Id.
130. As seen in the negligence discussion, however, “reasonably foreseeable risk of harm” is not a
standard that admits of exact quantification; rather, it must be determined by reasonable persons in the
context of the social, environmental, and political conditions of their community. Thus, the possibility
of significant harm may be acceptable under more foreseeable levels in some circumstances than others.
See generally Terry, supra note 38.
131. This assumes that the actor or person being protected has done nothing culpable to create the
risked threat or danger to life, health or dignity. Whether the same or different rules apply when the
actor has created the risk of harm to himself presents a special case outside the scope of consideration
here. This parallels the discussion in criminal law of whether a defendant who has created the
conditions leading to his or her assertion of the defense of necessity is entitled to do so. Cf. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 4, 20 (discussing approach of the Model Penal Code and New York to
situations where the actor himself creates the circumstances leading to the assertion of the necessity
defense).
132. John C.P. Goldberg, Tort, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 28 (Peter Cane & Mark
Tushnet eds., 2003) (“The economic approach . . . entitles actors to disregard the well-being of others
simply because it is more expensive to society to take steps to avoid injuring them than to cause them
injury.”).
486 [Vol. 3:453THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
cally be sacrificed to preserve inherent human goods.133
In the case of risking unintentional harm to fundamental human goods,
however, the risked harm cannot be understood as rationally subordinated to the
intended good. When, for example, a strategic bomber destroys a military
installation with foreseeable risk of injury or death to civilians,134 the value of
the lives protected by the bomber at home is not ethically superior to the value
of those non-combatant lives in the enemy country. Rather both the good
intended (preservation of lives of family and friends at home) and the foresee-
able harm (death of non-combatants) are instances of goods that are ultimately
irreducible to one another on a utilitarian scale. Each life functions as an end in
itself, and resolution of a conflict of values in such a situation cannot be
achieved by application of a mathematical formula. No moral calculus can
rationally justify an ethical requirement that one or more innocent lives be
intentionally destroyed for the “value” of preserving one or more other innocent
lives. Each life, as an intrinsic good, functions as an irreducible, incommensu-
rable object and thus, in that very irreducibility, is “proportionate” to any other
instance of fundamental human value.135
In precisely such circumstances, however, DE becomes relevant. Rather than
prohibiting all harmful conduct in such circumstances, DE proposes that the
right to intentionally preserve a fundamental good in oneself or another—
133. As illustrated by the legal privileges of public and private necessity, it is also true that
instrumental goods may even be intentionally sacrificed for the sake of intrinsic human goods. Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 196-97 (1965). Such examples illustrate cases where neither the
law nor DE prohibits all intentional causing of harm.
In fact, with respect to instrumental goods, it may sometimes be the case that intentional causing of
harm is less culpable than a negligent causing of harm. For example, physical pain—which is not in
itself contrary to a basic human good—may on occasion permissibly be caused intentionally, for
example, a dentist probing a patient’s gum seeking to produce pain in order to determine if the tissue
has been properly anesthetized. That same pain, however, if caused unintentionally by the dentist could
be a sign of lack of due care for the patient and thus would arguably lead to culpability. In such cases,
however, the intentionally caused harm is permissible and preferable to the negligently caused harm,
because it does not represent a case where the harm violates of a basic good of the patient but instead
represents an instrumental good that is justified by the circumstances. Of course, in other situations,
where no justification for the intentional harming of instrumental goods exists, intentional harming
would generally be worse than mere negligent harming: for example, if a dentist intentionally caused
pain for its own sake without justification versus causing similar pain negligently in the course of some
legitimate procedure.
134. Based on distinctions between the intentions of the actors, many discussions of DE propose that
a strategic bomber’s conduct would often be permissible while that of a terror bomber’s would not. See,
e.g., McIntyre, supra note 7, at 219 (“The terror bomber aims to bring about civilian deaths in order to
weaken the resolve of the enemy: when his bombs kill civilians this is a consequence that he intends.
The strategic bomber aims at military targets while foreseeing that bombing such targets will cause
civilian deaths. When his bombs kill civilians this is a foreseen but unintended consequence of his
actions. Even if it is equally certain that the two bombers will cause the same number of civilian deaths,
terror bombing is impermissible, while strategic bombing is permissible.”).
135. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 120 (1980) (“To choose an act which
in itself simply . . . damages a basic good is thereby to engage oneself . . . in an act of opposition to an
incommensurable value . . . which one treats as it if were an object of measurable worth that could be
outweighed by commensurable objects of greater (or cumulatively greater) worth.”).
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assuming no culpability of the actor in creating the necessity of that decision—
may sometimes justify a choice that has the unintentional but foreseeable risk of
harming inherent goods in others or in oneself.136
In keeping with the autonomous nature of persons, an actor has an inherent
right to protect those fundamental goods in himself or in others when they
become threatened. In view of that right—absent some special duty of the
actor—imposition on others of unintended harms of a proportionate magnitude
to protect such a good cannot be regarded as unfair or unreasonable. Thus,
while a civilian has a right not to be intentionally killed by combatants, it is not
equally true that a non-combatant has a moral right not to be unintentionally
killed when other conditions of DE are satisfied.
DE, of course, imposes significant limitations upon an actor’s right to cause
such unintended harm. First, emphasizing the role of the intended/foreseen
distinction, such conduct can only be taken when the harm to the other is
unintended.137 To choose such harm intentionally and purposefully would be to
intentionally destroy a fundamental good. Such an intention would therefore
entail a contradictory attitude with respect to the very rationale of the “good”
the actor offers to justify his or her conduct. By intentionally destroying a
fundamental good in order to intentionally preserve a fundamental good, an
actor subjectively identifies himself with destruction of that type of good and, in
so doing manifests an inherently selfish, irrational, and arbitrary volitional
attitude toward basic goods themselves. In short, intentionally causing such
harm violates DE’s proscription against intentionally doing evil to achieve
good.138
Further, DE would also prohibit conduct whenever the extent of the uninten-
tional causing of harm was not “reasonably ordered” to the good intended.139
Thus DE would not permit any unnecessary harm, that is, harm over and above
that reasonably required to preserve the intended good. If a threatened and
reasonable good could be permissibly protected by less harmful means, DE
136. Id. (“[U]nsought but unavoidable side-effects accompany every human choice, and their
consequences are incalculable. But it is always reasonable to leave some of them, and often reasonable
to leave all of them, out of account . . . . [T]o indirectly [unintentionally] damage any basic good (by
choosing an act that directly and immediately promotes that basic good . . . or some other basic good
. . . ) is obviously quite different, rationally and thus morally from directly and immediately damaging a
basic good . . . ”).
137. See Mangan, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
138. This principle is confirmed in the law in its unwavering refusal to allow self-preservation as an
exculpating rationale for intentionally killing another innocent person, even in order to save one’s own
life, regardless of whether the killer seeks to be justified under the defense of necessity or excused
under duress. See, e.g., United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 206 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We are persuaded
that duress is not a valid defense to . . . first degree murder. We believe that, consistent with the
common law rule, a defendant should not be excused from taking the life of an innocent third person
because of the threat of harm to himself.”); State v. Tate, 194 N.J. Super. 622, 627 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1984) (“[W]hen deliberate homicide was involved . . . common law courts did not allow necessity
as a justification for the criminal act.”).
139. See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 4, at 486 n.64 and accompanying text.
488 [Vol. 3:453THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
would prohibit as unreasonable the causing of superfluous injury. Similarly, if
the probability of successfully preserving the intended good was remote and the
probability of harm great, causing that harm, even unintentionally, would
generally be presumptively unjustified.
In sum, in applying DE analysis, no economic or other utilitarian calculus can
resolve all conflicts created by the clash between values presented in the
practical options open to the actor. Rather, only normative standards reasonably
respecting the ethical values at stake can provide actors with guidelines for
determining the reasonability of choice. Limiting the causing of foreseeable
harm to fundamental goods only when unintentional and only when required for
the preservation of proportionate fundamental goods reasonably respects such
limitations. Stated differently, DE provides a normative limitation on one’s right
to cause harm to another and, at the same time, delineates the parameters of
one’s ethical right to be free from harm caused by others. As Ripstein had
appropriately remarked concerning negligence, but which applies equally to
DE, “In the idiom of responsibility, norms of conduct mark the line between
what a person has done and what is (merely) a by-product of her action.”140
III. CASE ILLUSTRATIONS
Having illustrated significant overlap between DE and negligence analysis, it
will be useful before concluding this Article to illustrate these parallels con-
cretely. Consideration of a sampling of negligence cases illustrates that similar
culpability determinations may be reached under either mode of analysis.
A. Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants141
In February of 1992, eighty-one-year-old Stella Liebeck purchased a cup of
coffee at a McDonald’s “drive-thru” and shortly afterward spilled it on herself
while attempting to add cream and sugar. The scalding liquid caused third-
degree burns to her legs and groin.142 Ms. Liebeck instituted a civil action
against McDonald’s after rejecting a settlement offer of $800. At the conclusion
of trial, the jury determined that Ms. Liebeck had been 20% at fault and
McDonald’s 80%. Accordingly, the jury reduced the damage award from
$200,000 to $160,000 and awarded Ms. Liebeck $2.7 million in punitive
damages.143
During litigation of the case, it was disclosed that McDonald’s coffee was
brewed at somewhere between 195 to 205 degrees and served at 180 to 190
degrees—more than 20 degrees hotter than comparable eateries. The evidence
140. Ripstein, supra note 29, at 661.
141. Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, at *1 (N.M.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994).
142. Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9
Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at A1.
143. Liebeck, 1995 WL 360309 at *1.
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further established that McDonald’s had received notice of 700 burn cases in the
decade prior to Ms. Liebeck’s claim144 and paid out approximately $750,000 in
settlements.145 McDonald’s admitted it was aware that its coffee caused serious
burns, including testimony from a McDonald’s quality assurance supervisor
who conceded knowing that the coffee could scald the throat and esophagus.146
Although the cups bore the phrase “CAUTION: CONTENTS HOT,” this phrase
could barely be distinguished from the trim on the cups, and McDonald’s
considered it a “reminder” not a warning.147
In defense of its conduct, McDonald’s submitted evidence that the high
temperature of the coffee provided optimal taste and was preferred by custom-
ers. Consumer studies had revealed that “morning coffee has minimal taste
requirements, but must be hot.”148 In any event, McDonald’s indicated that it
had no intention to alter its coffee brewing practices stating, “[t]here are more
serious dangers in restaurants.”149 In further justification of its conduct, an
expert for McDonald’s testified that the number of burns was “basically trivially
different from zero”150 and “statistically insignificant” when considered in light
of the amount of coffee sold by the corporation.151
The reports of the proceedings and statements describing the jurors’ evalua-
tion of the case suggest that McDonald’s made precisely the argument expected
under an economic efficiency analysis: the marginal costs of providing a cooler
cup of coffee (customer dissatisfaction and lower sales) justified the statistically
small number of burn costs that could foreseeably be caused by such con-
duct.152
The jury, however, concluded that rather than exculpating McDonald’s, the
evidence justified finding it liable and imposing punitive damages. In rejecting
McDonald’s defense, the jury appeared to place great weight on testimony
provided by McDonald’s itself. One juror stated afterwards that the case re-
vealed “callous disregard for the safety of the people.”153 Another juror indi-
cated that comments about the statistical insignificance of customer burns
implied that McDonald’s thought that such injuries, like those suffered by Ms.
Liebeck, were of little importance because they did not occur often. The juror
stated, “There was a person behind every number and I don’t think the corpora-
tion was attaching enough importance to that . . . . The facts were so overwhelm-
144. Consumer News, Large Award Chills Restaurant Serving Hot Coffee, 7 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
2 (1994).
145. Michael McCann et al., Java Jive: Genealogy of a Juridical Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 113, 125
(2001).
146. Id. at 124.
147. Id. at 125.
148. Gerlin, supra note 142.
149. Id.
150. McCann, supra note 145, at 125.
151. Gerlin, supra note 142.
152. See, e.g., supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
153. Gerlin, supra note 142.
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ingly against the company. They were not taking care of their customers.”154
The jury’s culpability judgment against McDonald’s illustrates a positive
liability determination under application of either negligence or DE analysis.
McDonald’s was not intentionally burning its customers, nor did the burning of
the customers contribute as a means to the end that McDonald’s had in selling
such hot coffee. Rather, McDonald’s was intentionally selling hot coffee, acting
in view of its legitimate right to provide consumers the type of morning coffee
they wanted, and in view of the economic benefit that the company received
from such sales. Burns were a foreseeable but unintended risk of that conduct.
In this case, the jury’s conclusion that McDonald’s conduct was wrongful
cannot be warranted by appeal to a utilitarian economic efficiency. Rather, jury
questioning revealed that it was quite likely the fact that McDonald’s advanced
the utilitarian argument that provided the basis for imposing punitive dam-
ages.155 In short, jury members’ statements implied that they believed that
McDonald’s intentional pursuit of a legitimate business goal—profit maximiza-
tion and consumer satisfaction—could not justify the threat of significant
unintended harm to the rights of its customers to be free from reasonably
foreseeable significant harm. While the occurrence of such incidents may have
been rare, the risk was thought to be of sufficient foreseeability and magnitude
in light of the good intended to demand that McDonald’s compensate the
injured customer.
The jury’s determination, viewed under either negligence analysis or DE,
illustrates that the conduct of McDonald’s, though in itself intentionally directed
at a permissible end, could not justify the unintended, albeit foreseeable, risk of
harm, despite its apparent justification as an economical accident.
B. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. Krayenbuhl156
In Krayenbuhl, a four-year old child’s ankle was severed while playing on a
railroad turntable located on private property.157 The turntable was equipped
with a locking device that either was not in place the day of the accident or was
defective and had been removed by the children. The railroad was on notice as
to all these facts.
Appealing a jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant-railroad
argued that application of the so-called “doctrine of the turntable cases” was
erroneous.158 The doctrine asserted that “where a turntable is so situated that its
owner may reasonably expect that children too young to appreciate the danger
will resort to it, and amuse themselves by using it, it is guilty of negligence for a
failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent such use.”159
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
156. 91 N.W. 880 (Neb. 1902).
157. Id. at 881.
158. Id. at 882.
159. Id. at 881-82.
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Interpreting this doctrine, the trial court had concluded that when an owner is
on notice that young children might be found on premises subject to this danger,
the owner “is bound to take such precautions to keep them from such premises,
or to protect them from injuries likely to result from the dangerous condition of
the premise while there, as a man of ordinary care and prudence, under like
circumstances, would take.”160
Upholding the district court’s application of the doctrine, the Nebraska
Supreme Court nevertheless conceded the propriety of defendant’s reference to
Loomis v. Terry,161 stating that:
The business of life is better carried forward by the use of dangerous
machinery; hence the public good demands its use, although occasionally
such use results in the loss of life or limb. It does so because the danger is
insignificant, when weighed against the benefits resulting from the use of such
machinery, and for the same reason demands its reasonable, most effective
and unrestricted use, up to the point where the benefits resulting from such
use no longer outweigh the danger to be anticipated from it. At that point, the
public good demands restrictions.162
In considering the defendant’s appeal, the court noted that while it was
possible to conceive of ways to make turntables absolutely safe, such practices
would indeed make their use impractical.163 The court agreed that the freedom
to operate trains must be permitted up to the point where good obtained from
such use “no longer outweighs the danger to be anticipated from it.”164 The
court noted that a permissible level of danger can involve “occasional[] . . . loss
of life or limb.” At the point, however, when the danger to be anticipated from
the operation of the railroad exceeds that threshold, the court indicated that the
public good would “demand[] restriction.”165
Applying these principles derived from Loomis to the case before it, the
Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict for the plaintiff. The court
held that the railroad’s failure to have a lock on the turntables was negligent
because “the interference with the proper use of the turntable occasioned by the
use of such lock is so slight that it is outweighed by the danger to be anticipated
from an omission to use it . . . .”166
Krayenbuhl appropriately illustrates the distinction between reasonable and
unreasonable levels of foreseeable risk at play both in negligence and DE and
highlights considerations relevant to determinations of culpability in cases
160. Id. at 882.
161. 17 Wend. 496, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (“The business of life must go forward, and the fruits
of industry must be protected.”).
162. Krayenbuhl, 91 N.W. at 882-83.
163. Id. at 883.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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involving instrumental goods. It is clear, for example, that the railroad had no
intent to injure members of the public, nor did the injuries contribute as a means
to benefits achieved from the intentional operation of a railroad. The question
instead is simply whether the intended good achieved by the operation of the
railroad, or the manner of that operation, was reasonable in light of that
foreseeable risk of unintended harm.
In explicitly identifying a reasonable and acceptable risk level incident to the
provision of railroad service—the occasional loss of life or limb—the court
acknowledges that intentional pursuit of important goods can permissibly create
general risks of significant harm under conditions of low foreseeability.167 In
such cases, the remotely foreseen risk is permissible because the value to human
society of operating locomotives carries with it unavoidable risk of danger to
human life. The foreseeable injuries caused by virtue of that risk, however, are
judged permissible because the activity creates only a remote risk of harm that
does not generally bear on any particular individual.168
Under the facts of this particular case, however, where children who know no
better are subject to a higher probability of serious harm, that is, where “injuries
[are] likely to result from the dangerous condition,”169 the owner has a duty to
restrict his use of railroad facilities and exclude such persons from the property
or otherwise protect them from harm through reasonably prudent means. In
such a case, the injury caused to a child would be unacceptable under both a
negligence analysis and DE because the intended good—unrestricted operation
of the railroad turntable—would not be sufficiently reasonable in view of the
reasonably foreseeable risk of significant harm to the rights of the children
presented under the circumstances.
C. Cordas v. Peerless Transportation170
In Cordas, a negligence action was instituted by a mother and child injured
by a runaway taxi-cab after the driver had abandoned the vehicle in an effort to
escape the lethal threats made by his passenger. The passenger had committed a
robbery and commandeered the cab in an attempt to flee the scene of the crime.
The plaintiffs in this case argued that:
[T]he value of the interests of the public at large to be immune from being
injured by a dangerous instrumentality such as a car unattended while in
motion is very superior to the right of a driver of a motor vehicle to abandon
same while it is in motion even when acting under the belief that his life is in
danger and by abandoning same he will save his life.171
167. Id. at 882.
168. Id.
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941).
171. Id. at 200.
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The evidence presented at trial indicated that the cab driver, immediately before
jumping from the vehicle, took the car out of gear (presumably putting it into
neutral), pulled the emergency brake, and jammed on the foot brakes.172
Dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim in negligence,
the court noted that the driver’s actions could not be “legally construed as the
proximate cause of plaintiff’s [sic] injuries . . . unless nature’s first law [of
self-preservation] is arbitrarily disregarded. . . . ‘[W]here it is a question whether
one of two men shall suffer, each is justified in doing the best he can for
himself.’”173 The court further noted that while such an act might be negligent
under normal circumstances, it would not necessarily be negligent in emergency
situations, that is, “if performed by a person acting under an emergency, not of
his own making, in which he suddenly is faced with a patent danger with a
moment left to adopt a means of extrication.”174
On the facts of this case, the cab driver had no intention of physically
harming the plaintiffs, nor did that foreseeable harm play any role as a means to
the safety obtained by abandoning the vehicle. Rather, the harm caused to the
plaintiffs was nothing other than an unintended but foreseeably risked side-
effect of abandoning a moving vehicle. In determining whether creating such a
risk was unlawful, however, the court specifically and categorically rejected the
rule advanced by the plaintiffs that would require an actor to sacrifice his own
life rather than create substantial threats to “the public at large.”175 The court
held instead that the right to create such risks is consistent with the right of
every person to seek to preserve his or her own life.176
This analysis confirms the fundamental similarity of negligence to DE by
illustrating that intentional pursuit of certain types of goods may in some
circumstances justify causing unintended, albeit foreseeable, harms to fundamen-
tal human goods.177
Especially noteworthy for understanding the operation of DE reasoning in the
law is the court’s statement that the driver’s actions could not be “legally
construed as the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries . . . .”178 The notion of
proximate cause and its related concept of “cause-in-fact” are introduced in
legal analysis precisely to isolate those particular causes of injury that function
as appropriate bases for legal culpability and punishment. “Proximate causes”
are thus distinguished from the myriad of other causes of occurrences or events
172. Id. at 199-200.
173. Id. at 201 (citing Laidlaw v. Sage, 52 N.E. 679, 690 (N.Y. 1899)).
174. Cordas, 27 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
175. Id. at 200.
176. Id.
177. Other cases cite duress or emergency and risk of harm to third persons to justify such harms.
See, e.g., Lucchese v. San Francisco-Sacramento R.R. Co., 289 P. 188 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930); Thurmond
v. Pepper, 119 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
178. Cordas, 27 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
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that are regarded as lacking in culpability and free from legal liability.179
Factors determining what constitutes proximate cause may vary. In many
contexts, what constitutes a proximate cause cannot be defined merely by its
character as a cause-in-fact, that is, as a factor having a direct physical causal
connection between conduct and an effect. Rather, the finding of a proximate
cause often depends upon policy considerations incorporating notions of justice
and fairness:
This limitation [of proximate cause] is to some extent associated with the
nature and degree of the connection in fact between the defendant’s acts and
the events of which the plaintiff complains. Often to a greater extent, how-
ever, the legal limitation on the scope of liability is associated with policy—
with our more or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands,
or of what is administratively possible and convenient.180
The usefulness of the concept of proximate cause for understanding DE and
its role in negligence analysis (as suggested by the Cordas case) is that it
uncontrovertibly illustrates in a legally familiar context the fact that sometimes
one’s conduct—though a direct cause-in-fact of foreseeable “evil”—may not be
held to be a culpable cause in the legal sense. “Causation-in-fact” does not in all
circumstances carry with it the notion of liability-bearing cause.
In Cordas, the cab driver’s conduct was undeniably a cause-in-fact of the
harmful effect as a sine qua non and substantial factor in effecting the harm.
Yet, in view of the absence of intent to cause the harm, combined with a
sufficiently reasonable intended good aimed at by the actor’s conduct, the court
found that the actor’s conduct could not constitute a “legal” cause of the
unintended, foreseeable harm caused thereby.181
In both negligence and DE, one’s conduct may causally bring about or be a
cause-in-fact of harmful consequences. Nevertheless, such conduct will not be
judged a culpable or a “proximate cause” of that harm if the harm is in fact
unintended and is judged reasonable in light of the actor’s intention to preserve
a fundamental good.
D. Eckert v. Long Island Railroad Company182
In Eckert, a three- or four-year-old child was spotted upon a railroad track
directly in the path of a negligently operated train. Henry Eckert, plaintiff’s
179. “In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of
an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. But any attempt to impose responsibility
upon such a basis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would ‘set society on edge
and fill the courts with endless litigation.’ As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to
those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is
justified in imposing liability.” KEETON, supra note 22, §41, at 264 (footnote omitted).
180. Id. at 264.
181. Cordas, 27 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
182. 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
2005] 495BALANCING ACTS
decedent and husband, seeing the tragedy about to unfold, ran to the tracks,
snatched up the child, and tossed the child safely to the far side of the tracks.
Eckert himself, however, carried forward by momentum, was unable to stop
short and attempted to vault the tracks. Unfortunately, Eckert failed to clear the
track, was struck by the train, and died from his injuries.183
In answer to a negligence action brought by Eckert’s wife, the defendant-
railroad asserted contributory negligence against Eckert.184 The defendant ar-
gued that because Eckert could have foreseen the risk of harm or death created
by his conduct, he was negligent. As the dissent in Eckert explained, restating
the railroad’s position:
One who with liberty of choice, and knowledge of the hazard of injury,
places himself in a position of danger, does so at his own peril, and must take
the consequences of his act. This rule has been applied to actions for torts as
well as to actions upon contract, under almost every variety of circumstance.
. . . .
. . . The testator had full view of the train and saw, or could have seen, the
manner in which it was made up, and the locomotive attached, and the speed
at which it was approaching, and, if in the exercise of his free will, he chose
for any purpose to attempt the crossing of the track, he must take the
consequence of his act.185
The majority opinion, however, rejected the dissent’s analysis and affirmed
the jury verdict in favor of Eckert’s wife.186 The court found that under the
relevant rule of law, the evidence supported the finding that Eckert was not
negligent.187 Distinguishing the facts of the case before it, the court agreed that
Eckert’s conduct would have been grossly negligent if his purpose in acting had
been merely for the protection of property or for some other private purpose.188
Given that the purpose of conduct was to save the life of another, however,
similar reasoning did not apply:
The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence
to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such circumstances as to
constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons. For a person engaged
in his ordinary affairs, or in the mere protection of property, knowingly and
183. Id. at 503-04.
184. This case appears to represent an early tacit adoption of the modern rescue doctrine as a way to
avoid defendants’ assertion of contributory negligence against the plaintiff. Cf. Dillard v. Pittway Corp.,
719 So. 2d 188, 193 (Ala. 1988) (“The rescue doctrine arose as a way to establish causal relation
between the action of the defendant and the harm to a rescuer and to prohibit the negligent defendant
from using the affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence against the
rescuer.”).
185. 43 N.Y. at 507 (Allen, J., dissenting).
186. 43 N.Y. at 505.
187. Id. at 505-06.
188. Id. at 506.
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voluntarily to place himself in a position where he is liable to receive a
serious injury, is negligence, which will preclude a recovery for an injury so
received; but when the exposure is for the purpose of saving life, it is not
wrongful, and therefore not negligent unless such as to be regarded either rash
or reckless.189
The majority opinion in Eckert ties together many of the elements of negli-
gence and DE discussed above.190 First, the opinion rejects the application of
contributory negligence to the decedent’s conduct, illustrating that under the law
actors will not always be regarded as culpable for causing foreseeable, seriously
harmful consequences. Under certain circumstances, intended ends may justify
acceptance of significant foreseeable but unintended harm risked by their
conduct.
As explicitly confirmed by the court’s discussion, the criterion for determin-
ing culpability in such situations depends upon the nature of the good intended
compared to the nature of the unintended, foreseeable harm caused.191 In the
case of purposeful conduct aimed at protecting interests in property or goods
other than human life itself, a correlative risk of significant harm to fundamental
human goods, either in oneself or in others, would be unreasonable and there-
fore unjustified. When, however, the intended good is preservation of life itself
or some other fundamental good, not only may one risk foreseen significant
harm to property, one may without culpability risk reasonably foreseeable
significant harm to oneself or others.192
Eckert also confirms the limitations on DE suggested above regarding unnec-
essary harm and considerations of the likelihood of attaining one’s intended
end. The foreseen level of unintended harm must be within reasonable bound-
aries and must be necessary to attain one’s goal. Unreasonable harm is not
permissible. In this context, an actor must also take into account the degree of
probability that one’s intentional conduct will achieve its intended goal. When
risking one’s own life to save another would be futile, or when the foreseen but
189. Id.
190. Terry in his early formulation of the negligence formula explicitly considered Eckert under the
various elements of his test. See Terry, supra note 38, at 43-44.
191. “Under the circumstances in which the deceased was placed, it was not wrongful in him to
make every effort in his power to rescue the child, compatible with a reasonable regard for his own
safety. It was his duty to exercise his judgment as to whether he could probably save the child without
serious injury to himself. If, from the appearances, he believed that he could, it was not negligence to
make an attempt so to do, although believing that possibly he might fail and receive an injury himself.”
43 N.Y. at 505-06.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 472 cmt. a (1965) reflects exactly the same conclusions:
“[A] plaintiff may run a greater risk to his own personal safety in a reasonable effort to save the life of a
third person than he could run in order to save . . . animate or inanimate chattels . . . . Whether a
plaintiff is acting reasonably in exposing himself to a particular risk in order to protect a third person
from harm depends upon the comparison between the extent of the risk and the gain to be realized by
encountering it, which includes two things: first, the likelihood that the rescue will be successful and,
second, the gravity of the peril in which the third person has been placed. It may be reasonable for a
plaintiff to take a very considerable risk in order to save a human life.”
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unintended harm to another created by an effort to preserve one’s own life
would have little probability of leading to one’s survival, such conduct would
often be, as the court suggests, “rash or reckless” and therefore unreasonable
and impermissible.193 As the likelihood of securing the intended good dimin-
ishes, justification for causing the risk of unintended harm also decreases.
E. Synopsis
In sum, under either negligence or DE, identical conclusions regarding
permissibility and impermissibility of conduct may be reached. In Liebeck and
Krayenbuhl, conduct intentionally aimed at a permissible end is judged impermis-
sible because the good the actor intends does not justify the unintended but
foreseeable risk of harm attendant upon that conduct. As illustrated in Cordas
and Eckert, however, some instances of intentional conduct are permissible in
spite of their unintentional, foreseeable risk of harm.
CONCLUSION
Substantial overlap exists between the legal standard applied for determining
culpability under negligence and the conditions provided under double effect
analysis. Under each mode of reasoning, substantive distinctions are recognized
between intentionally causing harms and causing similar harms when they are
unintended, albeit foreseeable side-effects. When faced with situations where an
actor contemplates conduct that foreseeably risks causing harm, both theories
propose that the determination of whether an action is permissible requires
consideration of the normative nature of the values and interests that the actor
intentionally seeks to bring about compared to those that are unintentionally
threatened.
One important issue suggested by these considerations is the proper treatment
under the law and DE of unintended effects that are foreseen with relative
certainty. In negligence, as has been shown, when harm is not purposefully
intended, culpability depends not simply upon the probability or foreseeability
of harm, but also on the relative value of the intended good effect compared
with that foreseeable harm. The foregoing analysis of DE and negligence,
however, suggests the artificiality of categorically distinguishing situations
where an unintended harm is foreseen with less than substantial certainty from
those where harm is substantially certain to follow.
Critics of DE assert that when harmful effects are foreseen with substantial
certainty, any sort of “balancing” between those harms and what is intended is
precluded. These commentators assert that the law treats cases with side-effects
that are foreseen with relative certainty in a completely different manner than it
does harms foreseen with less than certainty.194
193. 43 N.Y. at 505.
194. See, e.g., 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 30 (2004) (“An act committed intentionally may give
rise to an action in negligence if one or more harmful consequences of the act are unintended, but if
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Based on the considerations entertained above, it is not apparent on its face
why double effect analysis—confirmed in a practical way in the general applica-
tion of the negligence standard—should cease to apply in legal contexts simply
because one moves from a less than certain probability of causing an unin-
tended harm to situations where such an effect is foreseen with substantial
certainty.195 Opponents of DE should be required to explain what warrants the
claim that an entirely different set of ethical and legal criteria should in all
circumstances be applied merely because of the differing degrees in probability
of foreseeable but unintended effects.196
Regardless of the resolution of this broader question, however, the preceding
Article argues that the “weighing” of conflicting values in double effect analysis
and negligence is not achieved—as proposed by law and economics theory—by
imposing a consequentialist-utilitarian reduction of all value to a single concept
of “good” and eliminating the relevance of traditional state-of-mind distinctions
between intention and foreseeability. Instead, each mode of analysis recognizes
that distinct culpability determinations flow naturally and plausibly from an
appreciation of the traditional legal distinctions made between various types of
goods and harms, and upon whether such goods and harms come about as the
result of an actor’s intention or are merely foreseeable.
Under both negligence analysis and the principle of double effect, the stan-
there is substantial certainty that an injury will result from an act . . . that act is an intentional act, not a
negligent act.”); Madeline V. Dvorocsik, Note, Maritime Losses Resulting from Reckless Conduct: Are
They Fortuitous?, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1133, 1140 (1997) (“One who acts with ‘the belief or consciousness
that the act is causing an appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the risk is great
the conduct may be characterized as reckless or wanton, but it is not an intentional wrong.’”). See also
Lyons, supra note 4, at 512-16 for a critical discussion of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section
8A’s treatment of foreseeability with substantial certainty as if there were intent.
195. The lack of justification for this treatment of substantial certainty as intent is strengthened when
one considers that substantial certainty itself is a malleable concept modulating from certainty to state
of mind considerations bordering on recklessness. See, e.g., Theresa J. Fontana, Proving Employer
Intent: Turner v. PCR, Inc. and the Intentional Tort Exception to the Workers’ Compensation Immunity
Defense, 25 NOVA L. REV. 365, 378-79 (2001):
Presenting evidence in support of an objective finding of intent requires an understanding of
what “substantial certainty” means. The court recedes from equating substantial certainty with
virtual certainty, and explains the concept as something greater than gross negligence but less
than being virtually sure. In Turner, the court hinted that substantial certainty may be
something closer to “culpable negligence.” Citing Eller v. Shova, the Supreme Court of
Florida defined culpable negligence as “reckless indifference” or “grossly careless disregard”
of human life. The court considers culpable negligence greater than gross negligence, but it is
clear the distinction involves a matter of degree.
Id.
196. In fact, contrary to the argument of opponents of double effect who assert that the law
“presumes that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her actions,” see supra
note 1, the law in fact often dispenses with this presumption and distinguishes an actor’s intent as
“desire” or “volition” from the causing of harms that are merely foreseen with substantial certainty. For
arguments supporting the operation of the principle of double effect in the legal context of conduct in
which harmful effects are foreseen with “substantial certainty,” see generally Lyons, supra note 4,
especially at 493-99 and 408-28.
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dard for determining whether conduct aimed at some intended good justifies
causing a foreseeable harm presupposes: 1) that under the circumstances the
harmful consequence could not itself be intended as a means or an end, and 2)
that the foreseen harm not be unreasonable in light of the intended good. If the
intended good is reasonable when contrasted to the unintended harm under
relevant norms, no culpability will be found; if, however, the foreseeable harm
is unreasonable in light of the intended good, such conduct will be deemed
culpable.
In short, reflection upon the differing nature of the culpability assessments
that arise out of the law’s settled distinction between negligent wrongdoing and
intentional wrongdoing, rather than providing a basis for rejecting applicability
of the principle of double effect in the law, confirms a place for that principle in
legal reasoning and theory.
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